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THE INFRINGEMENT CONTINUUM 
Bernard Chao† 
 For many years, patent law has struggled with the issue of permissible 
claim scope. A patent’s specification and its claims often suffer from a 
surprising disconnect. The specification generally describes an invention in 
terms of one or more specific implementations, suggesting a relatively 
narrow invention. But claims are drafted far more broadly. They frequently 
encompass unforeseen variations and even cover after-arising technology. 
 Although there are numerous existing doctrines that try to prevent 
claims from straying too far from their specification, these doctrines offer 
binary outcomes ill suited for patent law. Under these doctrines, as a claim 
encompasses subject matter further and further away from what the 
specification describes, there is a point where the inventor suddenly loses all 
rights. These outcomes make sense when all trespasses are considered equal 
wrongs. However, in reality, there is an infringement continuum. At one 
end of the continuum, infringement can look exactly like the invention 
described by a patent. That infringement should be treated far more 
seriously than infringement that resides at the other end of the continuum 
and looks very different from the invention. 
 Consequently, I propose a new theoretical framework that ties patent 
disclosure doctrine to the remedies the law provides. Although I would 
continue to use the claims to determine infringement, I suggest that the 
specification be used to assess the remedy. Specifically, I suggest replacing 
the current lost profits/reasonable royalty framework with one based on 
royalties that consider disclosure principles. The size of the royalty would be 
determined by comparing the infringement to the patent specification and 
adjusting the royalty based on the degree of similarity. 
 The proposal improves on existing doctrines in two fundamental ways. 
First, instead of offering binary outcomes, the proposed remedies are highly 
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adjustable. Therefore, they are well suited for addressing the full 
infringement continuum. Second, this proposal does not just focus on the 
patentee’s injury, as does the current law. Rather, it advances the public 
interest by optimizing incentives for both initial and follow-on innovators. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For many years, patent law has struggled with the issue of 
permissible claim scope. A patent’s specification and its claims often 
suffer from a surprising disconnect.1 The specification generally 
describes an invention in terms of one or more specific 
 
 1 A specification is a written description of the invention, while a patent’s claims delineate 
the boundaries of the property right. See infra notes 7–13 and accompanying text. 
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implementations, suggesting a relatively narrow invention. But claims 
are drafted far more broadly. They frequently encompass unforeseen 
variations and even cover after-arising technology. 
This Article argues that patent law should manage overbroad 
claims by fundamentally changing the way patent law looks at its 
remedies. Patent law has always viewed patents like personal property 
and attempted to restore the patentees to the place they would have 
occupied had there been no infringement. But these “make whole” 
remedies are inconsistent with the professed goal of patent law—
maximizing innovation in the name of the public welfare.2 For patent 
law to be faithful to this view, it should not be single mindedly focused 
on redressing the inventor’s injury. Rather, the law needs to be 
concerned about providing incentives for both patentees and any 
infringers that build on a patentee’s work. 
To allocate incentives properly, the law needs to be able to tune the 
remedy to match the full range of potential infringements. We can 
consider different types of infringement as falling along a continuum. At 
one end of the continuum, infringement can look exactly like the 
invention described by a patent. At the other end, infringement can be 
very different from the invention. Broad claims often reach deeply into 
this continuum. These broad claims cause significant problems. When 
claims reach technology that is too far afield from the invention, 
patentees are rewarded for something they did not invent and later 
innovators are unnecessarily burdened. 
A number of existing patent doctrines attempt to address this 
problem. The enablement requirement, written description 
requirement, claim construction, subject matter patentability, and the 
reverse doctrine of equivalents all limit broad claims to one degree or 
another. Nonetheless, defining just how broadly inventors may claim 
their inventions has proven to be extremely challenging. The 
jurisprudence of these doctrines is confusing and often yields 
unpredictable results. 
Numerous commentators have proposed various changes to these 
claim-limiting doctrines. For example, certain Federal Circuit judges 
advocate interpreting claims more narrowly based on the embodiments 
found in the specification.3 Other commentators suggest transforming 
the subject matter eligibility requirement so that its sole function would 
be to address overbroad claims.4 But no matter how the law might 
tinker with these standards and tests, these doctrines all suffer from one 
fundamental limitation. They yield only two outcomes. If the patentee is 
 
 2 Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517, 529–
36 (2014). 
 3 See infra notes 109–11 and accompanying text. 
 4 See infra notes 135–36 and accompanying text. 
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allowed to enforce a broad claim, all of patent law’s remedies are 
available. On the other hand, if the claim is determined to be too broad, 
the patentee recovers nothing. Doctrines that only have binary 
outcomes will never be able to effectively handle the range of 
infringements that reside on the continuum. 
Accordingly, I propose a more nuanced approach to the problem 
of overbroad claims. My proposal does not try to fix the different 
doctrines that limit claim scope and make them more predictable. To 
some extent, these problems are intractable. Instead, I suggest that 
patent law replace its current lost-profits/reasonable-royalty framework 
with a single royalty system that considers the proximity of the 
infringement to the invention. Under this theory, the patentee’s remedy 
diminishes when the nature of the infringement looks less and less like 
what the specification describes. This theory is unconcerned with what 
the patentee lost and instead focuses on the relative contribution the 
patent made to the infringing device. By rethinking patent remedies in 
terms of disclosure principles, the proposal described in this Article 
tailors the remedy to better address the infringement continuum. 
Consequently, this proposal improves on existing doctrines that only 
offer binary outcomes. 
Part I of this Article explains why claims can look so much broader 
than the invention the patentee describes and the difficulties this creates. 
Under the current system of peripheral claiming, patents consist of both 
a written specification and claims. The specification teaches the public 
how to practice the invention while the claims define the property right. 
In practice, specifications describe one or more specific embodiments of 
the invention. But patent attorneys intentionally draft the claims as 
broadly as possible. In many cases, these claims end up covering 
variations or improvements that have little resemblance to the original 
invention.5 Such overbroad claims reward inventors for technology that 
they did not invent and unnecessarily burden downstream innovation. 
The problem of broad claims is exacerbated by the problem of 
unclear claims. Patent claims use words to try to describe the scope of 
technical concepts. To do so precisely is probably impossible.6 There are 
always disputes around what claims mean and even the proper 
methodology for interpreting those claims. The result is that patent 
 
 5 Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 5 (2009) (noting that the doctrine of equivalents also “grants protection to patent 
holders for creations that by definition were not—and indeed could not have been—in their 
possession at the time of their patent applications”); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of 
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1005 (1997) (“[P]atent claims 
may reach new and unanticipated inventions made after the patent issues, but which fall within 
the literal language of the claims.”). 
 6 See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction 
Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 259 (2008). 
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scope is notoriously unpredictable. Because of this uncertainty, 
companies may avoid using technology not covered by a patent or 
simply pay undeserved licensing fees. Alternatively, companies may roll 
the dice and let the courts tell them if they are infringing a patent. Each 
of these choices burdens innovation in different ways. 
Part II discusses the various patent doctrines that are used to 
restrain claims from straying too far from their specification. Several 
doctrines declare that overly broad claims are invalid. Chief among 
these is the enablement requirement; it requires that the written 
specification enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to practice the 
claimed invention. If the specification fails to teach the full scope of the 
claim, that claim is invalid. Applying different tests, the written 
description and subject matter patentability requirements also can be 
used to invalidate claims that cover subject matter that departs too far 
from the specification. 
Other patent doctrines leave broad claims intact, but constrain 
their scope. Courts can use the patent’s specification to interpret claims 
narrowly. Thus, even when claims are drafted broadly, they may not 
reach as far as the patentee intended. These cases typically result in a 
finding of non-infringement. The little-used reverse doctrine of 
equivalents applies to subject matter that falls within the literal scope of 
a claim. The doctrine says that there is no infringement because the 
subject matter departs too far from the spirit of the invention. 
All these claim-limiting doctrines share two important 
characteristics. First, for the most part, these doctrines involve 
complicated concepts that make them difficult to apply. Consequently, 
outcomes are unpredictable. Second, all these doctrines have all-or-
nothing outcomes. Under the enablement, written description, and 
subject matter patentability doctrines, a claim is either valid or invalid. 
When the courts interpret claims or look to the reverse doctrine of 
equivalents, the result leads to a finding of infringement or non-
infringement. 
These all-or-nothing outcomes are a poor match for the different 
kinds of infringement that exist. There are countless flavors of potential 
infringement. This “infringement continuum” reflects varying degrees 
of potential claim scope. Although reasonable minds may disagree on 
how far into the continuum a patent should reach, no one should 
dispute that some kinds of infringements should be treated more 
seriously than others. A company that does precisely what the patent 
describes owes a greater debt to the patentee than a company that 
modifies the invention in some unforeseen ways or adds its own 
contributions. Relying on this basic insight, this Article proposes a 
different-remedies framework that compares the infringement to what 
the patent discloses. 
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The concept of tying patent remedies to disclosure principles can 
trace its roots to two different sets of existing proposals—adjusting the 
law of permanent injunctions and central claiming. Part III describes 
these proposals and explains how the current reform builds upon them. 
Several commentators argue that courts should not grant permanent 
injunctions when an infringing product significantly improves on the 
patentee’s invention. In effect, these proposals suggest that the 
patentee’s remedy should be reduced when the infringement looks less 
like the patentee’s original invention. But because these proposals only 
rely upon a single coarse lever (i.e., whether to grant a permanent 
injunction), they do not account for all the different kinds of 
infringement that exist. This Article takes the next step and suggests that 
money damages should be based on the proximity of the infringement 
to the patentee’s original invention. Since there is a large range of 
potential money damages, this reform can better account for all the 
types of infringement that lie on the continuum. 
Other commentators argue that U.S. patent law should return to a 
system of central claiming. This means that infringement 
determinations would be made by relying on the specification instead of 
the claims. The proposal would also place less weight on a patent’s 
claims and more weight on the patent’s specification. But instead of 
trying to fix claim scope, it assumes that the problem will always be with 
us. Consequently, the proposed reform attempts to adjust patent 
remedies to account for this uncertainty. 
Part IV describes a proposal for basing money damages on the 
infringement continuum. It first critiques the existing reasonable-
royalty/lost-profits framework. Both of these theories misguidedly focus 
on making patentees “whole” by returning them to the place they would 
have occupied had there been no infringement. But the goal of patent 
law is to promote the sciences. Any benefit that inventors receive is 
simply a necessary side effect of incentivizing innovation. The current 
system makes patentees whole at the cost of disincentivizing those who 
would build on existing technology. In contrast, using the infringement 
continuum to calculate damages would incentivize both the patentee 
and any innovating infringer by apportioning profits between them. 
Part V goes on to identify several important characteristics of a 
remedies reform that would use the infringement continuum to 
determine money damages in patent cases. Specifically, this Article 
argues that the law should eliminate the current bifurcated lost-
profits/reasonable-royalty regime and just use a royalty-based system. 
This “new” royalty calculation would not rely on the current Georgia-
Pacific test. Instead, it would base damages on a comparison of the 
infringing product to the patent’s specification. 
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There are two primary benefits of this reform. First, by calibrating 
damages to the contributions made by both the patentee and infringer, 
the proposal will allocate incentives in a manner that optimizes all kinds 
of innovation. Second, the proposed reform should reduce the cost of 
unclear claims. The problem of unclear claims looms largest at outer 
edges of a claim’s scope. Because the current reform reduces damages at 
these edges, any errors associated with unclear claims are likewise 
reduced. 
Finally, Part V also describes some exemplary methods for 
calculating damages using these principles. The primary example 
assesses similarity in two dimensions—how far the infringer has 
changed the basic invention and how much the infringer has added to 
the basic invention. Other variations are then added to this example to 
reflect the different values patent law may wish to highlight. The result 
is a flexible framework for balancing innovation incentives. 
I.     CLAIM SCOPE 
Patents are made up of two primary components, the specification 
and the claims. The specification is a written description of the 
invention. It describes one or more embodiments (i.e., examples) of the 
invention and usually includes drawings to help explain the nature of 
the invention. The claims follow the specification; they are of 
paramount importance because the claims define the scope of the 
patented invention.7 Each claim contains several limitations that define 
the claim’s attributes. Anyone who practices all the limitations found in 
any claim is said to infringe the patent.8 
Infringement determinations are centered on the patent’s claims 
and not its specification.9 Of course the specification still plays an 
important role. It is one of the primary sources of evidence used to 
interpret the meaning of the claims.10 But unlike the claims, the 
specification itself is never compared to the accused device.11 This 
 
 7 Astrazeneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 384 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“It is 
axiomatic that the claims mark the outer boundaries of the patent right to exclude.”). 
 8 See Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(noting that the “‘all limitations’” rule “holds that an accused product or process is not 
infringing unless it contains each limitation of the claim, either literally or by an equivalent”). 
 9 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim 
Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1744 (2009) (“In modern American patent doctrine, we 
define what the patentee owns not by what she actually built or disclosed, but by what she 
claimed.”); see also Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 
731–43 (2009) (describing the evolution of patent law’s claiming system). 
 10 See infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 11 SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(“Infringement, literal or by equivalence, is determined by comparing an accused product not 
with a preferred embodiment described in the specification, or with a commercialized 
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arrangement is intended to give the public notice of the scope of the 
inventor’s monopoly.12 Presumably, it is easier to discern the scope of an 
invention by examining claims specially prepared to delineate 
boundaries as opposed to a description of the invention.13 However, 
relying on claims to define the invention has its problems. Because these 
two components are separate, there may be a surprising disconnect 
between the specification and the claims. The specification may appear 
to describe a narrow invention while the claims are extremely broad.14 
Figure 1 below illustrates this point. 
The specification typically describes embodiments that fall within 




A.     Broad Claims 
Patent attorneys draft claims as broadly as they can. In fact, they 
often deliberately seek overly broad claims in the hope that the patent 
 
embodiment of the patentee, but with the properly and previously construed claims in suit.” 
(citing ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1984) and 
Teledyne McCormick Selph v. United States, 558 F.2d 1000, 1007 (Ct. Cl. 1977))). 
 12 Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931) (“[A patent must contain claims 
that] inform the public during the life of the patent of the limits of the monopoly asserted, so 
that it may be known which features may be safely used or manufactured without a license and 
which may not.”). 
 13 Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into After-Arising Technology: 
On Thing Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 502 (2008) 
(explaining how the current system of using claims facilitates the public notice function of 
patents). But see Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1783–99; Fromer, supra note 9, at 723 
(arguing that the patent system should rely less on claims and more on a system of central 
claiming that would use the embodiments described in the specification to determine a patent’s 
boundaries). 
 14 Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1, 15 (2012) (“[T]he embodiments disclosed in the specification are not the limit of the 
allowable subject matter; rather, they form the starting point from which the claim scope 
negotiation begins.” (emphasis added)); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 341, 356 (2010) (“[C]ourts and the Patent Office typically allow patent claims that are of 
much broader scope than what is actually disclosed in a patent application.”). 
CHAO.35.4 (Do Not Delete) 4/10/2014  2:21 PM 
2014] T H E  IN F R IN G E ME N T  C O N T IN U U M  1367 
 
office will accept them.15 The prior art serves as a check on claim 
breadth.16 Patents are only granted for new inventions. Consequently, 
claims that are drafted so expansively that they would cover the prior art 
are not patentable.17 Likewise, trivial claims that would be obvious in 
view of the prior art are also unpatentable.18 
But the prior art is not the only restraint on broad claims. An 
inventor cannot claim all subject matter that is not found in or 
suggested by the prior art. There must be a sufficiently strong 
connection between what the inventor describes in the patent’s 
specification and what she claims. In practical terms, the question is 
whether claims should be limited to the embodiment(s) disclosed in the 
specification or whether they can cover variations that were never 
described. If the latter choice is selected, the issue becomes how patent 
law can restrain the scope of the claims so that they are not unbounded. 
The debate over claim breadth can be seen as far back as the 
nineteenth century. The famous inventor, Samuel Morse, obtained a 
patent containing several claims directed to what we now think of as the 
telegraph machine.19 However, the patent also contained an eighth 
claim that was not limited to any specific machinery. Rather it claimed 
the use of “electro-magnetism, however developed, for making or 
printing intelligible characters, letters, or signs, at any distances.”20 
Morse sued O’Reilly for patent infringement and the case reached the 
Supreme Court. 
In O’Reilly v. Morse, the majority was understandably concerned 
that the eighth claim would prevent future inventors from using an 
entirely different mode of writing or printing that was not described in 
Morse’s patent.21 Essentially, the majority did not want the patent to 
 
 15 Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law 
Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1603 (2009) (“In practice, clever lawyering can often 
produce a patent claim that covers more technological ground than is truly warranted by the 
underlying invention.”); Chief Judge Paul Michel, Lecture: Innovation, Incentives, Competition, 
and Patent Law Reform: Should Congress Fix the Patent Office and Leave Litigation 
Management to the Courts?, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1135, 1168 (2010) 
(“Let’s be honest. Patent prosecutors are trying to get maximum scope, so they are always 
including some claims that are really well beyond what the inventor invented . . . .”).  
 16 Lemley, supra note 5, at 1001–02 (describing how the novelty and obviousness 
requirements limit the ability of inventors to draft broad claims). 
 17 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 18 Id. § 103. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415–22 (2007), for a discussion 
of the standard for determining obviousness. 
 19 See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 81–88 (1853). 
 20 Id. at 86. 
 21 See id. at 113 (“[S]ome future inventor, in the onward march of science, may discover a 
mode of writing or printing at a distance by means of the electric or galvanic current, without 
using any part of the process or combination set forth in the plaintiff’s specification. His 
invention may be less complicated—less liable to get out of order—less expensive in 
construction, and in its operation. But yet if it is covered by this patent the inventor could not 
use it, nor the public have the benefit of it without the permission of this patentee.”). 
CHAO.35.4 (Do Not Delete) 4/10/2014  2:21 PM 
1368 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 35:1359 
 
cover what Morse did not invent, and the eighth claim was declared 
invalid. But the dissent voiced legitimate concerns. It pointed out that 
patents should be able to cover simple improvements or changes to their 
inventions.22 The majority agreed saying that a patent can cover 
alterations to “unessential parts.”23 Of course the difficulty is 
determining when any modifications are sufficiently substantial that 
they cannot be claimed. In Morse’s case, the prevailing view was that the 
eighth claim went too far.24 Courts continue to struggle with similar 
problems to this day. How do you determine how far claims may reach 
beyond the embodiments found in the specification? In O’Reilly, the 
Supreme Court relied on the patent’s disclosure to limit claim breadth, 
but the decision did not provide a framework for using the specification 
to assess claim breadth. 
As discussed in Part II, the idea of using a patent’s disclosure to 
assess the validity of a broad claim continues to be found in a number of 
current patent doctrines. To one extent or another, the enablement 
requirement, written description requirement, and subject matter 
patentability doctrine all rely on the patent’s specification to invalidate 
unduly broad claims.25 Similarly, courts also can use the specification to 
constrain claim scope by interpreting claims narrowly or finding that 
there is no infringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents.26 
Notably, these doctrines do not go so far as to limit claims to 
embodiments described in the specification.27 Claims often cover 
variations of the invention that are not described in the specification. 
In fact, broad claims can even encompass after-arising 
technology.28 Consider one of the patents Apple is asserting against its 
 
 22 Id. at 134 (“The claim of the patentee is, that he may be protected in the exercise of his 
art as against persons who may improve or change some of the processes or machines necessary 
in its exercise.”). 
 23 Id. at 123 (“It is a well-settled principle of law, that the mere change in the form of the 
machinery (unless a particular form is specified as the means by which the effect described is 
produced) or an alteration in some of its unessential parts; or in the use of known equivalent 
powers, not varying essentially the machine, or its mode of operation or organization, will not 
make the new machine a new invention. It may be an improvement upon the former; but that 
will not justify its use without the consent of the first patentee.”). 
 24 Id. at 119–20. 
 25 See infra Part II.A–B, E. 
 26 See infra Part II.C–D. 
 27 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[A]lthough 
the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly 
warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”). 
 28 Collins, supra note 13, at 497 (“A number of high-profile cases expressly sanction the 
reach of literal claim scope into [after-arising technology] . . . . The routine phenomenon of 
blocking patents—successively issued patents that encompass the same technological thing—
implies that the scope of a patent claim grows over time to encompass technologies that by 
definition are not known . . . at the time of filing.”); Lemley, supra note 5, at 1005 (“[P]atent 
claims may reach new and unanticipated inventions made after the patent issues, but which fall 
within the literal language of the claims.”). 
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competitors in the ongoing smart phone patent wars. The invention of 
U.S. Patent No. 5,946,647 (the ‘647 patent) is related to automatically 
marking up types of data in an unstructured document in order to 
enable users to bring up other programs that process such data. The 
specification of the ‘647 patent disclosed several embodiments (i.e., 
examples) of the invention: recognizing a phone number and calling it 
or putting it in an electronic phone book; recognizing an address and 
writing a letter or putting the address in an address book; recognizing 
an e-mail address and sending an e-mail or putting the e-mail address in 
an e-mail address book; recognizing a date and putting it in an 
electronic calendar; and recognizing a name and writing a letter, calling 
the person, or putting it in a message folder.29 
The invention of the ‘647 patent clearly was intended to operate on 
personal computers.30 The patent was filed almost twenty years ago—
long before any phone had the ability to handle documents and e-mail.31 
Not surprisingly, the specification never mentions smart phones. 
Nevertheless, Apple successfully argued that HTC’s smart phones 
infringed this patent because they recognized phone numbers and 
turned them into hyperlinks. Users could then click on the hyperlinks to 
dial the phone numbers.32 Infringement was found even though the 
inventors probably did not foresee that their technology would be used 
in smart phones. Still, unlike Morse’s eighth claim, the application of 
Apple’s ‘647 patent to today’s smart phones probably does not offend 
most people’s sense of justice. After all, the accused smart phones were 
using technology that looked very similar to what Apple invented. 
These examples illustrate how broadly claims can reach. Claims 
clearly cover technology that looks precisely like the embodiments 
described in the patent. Minor variations may also fall within the scope 
of a patent’s claims even though they are not described in the 
specification. Finally, claims may also cover after-arising technology 
that could not be envisioned at the time the patent was filed. This 
happens in two ways. First, claims may cover unforeseen variations of 
the invention. For example, photographs are now routinely sent via e-
mail. The ‘647 patent might cover a computer that automatically 
recognizes the faces in a photo and indexes the photos accordingly.33 
 
 29 U.S. Patent No. 5,946,647 fig.4 (filed Feb. 1, 1996) (depicting each of these actions in 
Figure 4). 
 30 Figure 1 depicts the standard personal computer configuration of the time. See ’647 
Patent fig.1. 
 31 The patent was filed on February 1, 1996 and issued on August 31, 1999. 
 32 See In Re Certain Pers. Data & Mobile Commc’ns Devices & Related Software, Inv. No. 
337-TA-710, USITC Pub. 4331, at 123–35 (Dec. 19, 2011) (Final), available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/337/Pub4331_337-TA-710.pdf. 
 33 Reasonable minds may differ about whether the ‘647 patent should reach this far. See 
infra note 160 and accompanying text. 
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Second, claims can cover competitors that add something unforeseen to 
the invention, like the many features of HTC’s smart phone. These 
variations illustrate how the different kinds of infringement lie upon a 
continuum. But the point is that as a claim reaches further and further 
away from the specification, the law will eventually declare that the 
claim goes too far and cannot be enforced. That is what the Supreme 
Court concluded with respect to Morse’s eighth claim. 
Significant costs are associated with overly broad claims.34 Broad 
claims can lead to underinvestment in technology that builds on 
existing patented technology.35 Additionally, extremely broad claims 
offend our notions of fairness because they reward inventors for 
something that they did not invent.36 Samuel Morse’s eighth claim is a 
good example of this problem. Few would suggest that Morse deserves a 
patent on all electric machines that communicate. 
This view stands in sharp contrast to Edmund Kitch’s “prospect 
theory.”37 Prospect theory suggests that patents serve an important 
function beyond simply incentivizing innovation. Kitch argued that 
broad claims can be desirable because they allow a first mover to 
efficiently manage subsequent development and avoid wasteful 
duplicative investment.38 
However, I side with the critics of Kitch and reject the supposed 
benefits of prospect theory.39 Prospect theory fails to adequately account 
for two real world features of patent law. First, patents do not give their 
inventors the exclusive right to practice the fruits of their invention. 
Rather, they just give the right to exclude others from practicing the 
claimed invention. Multiple patents are typically needed to make most 
products, and ownership of those patents is often divided. Thus, 
granting broad claims does not give any one company the ability to 
 
 34 Of course there are often disputes about whether claims are overly broad. 
 35 Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 875 (1990) (“Property rights that are too narrow will not provide enough 
incentive to develop the asset, while overly broad rights will preempt too many competitive 
development efforts.”); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative 
Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 32 (1991) (“[S]uch broad protection can lead 
to deficient incentives to develop second generation products.”). 
 36 See Liivak, supra note 14, at 26–30 (criticizing the current law for allowing patents to 
claim more than the actual invention). 
 37 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 
265, 267 (1977). 
 38 Id. at 276, 278–79. 
 39 See, e.g., Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects, and Economic 
Surplus: A Comment, 23 J.L. & ECON. 197, 203 (1980) (“[P]rospect features [in a patents system] 
fail to assist market participants in their attempt to economize on the common property 
resource.”); Merges & Nelson, supra note 35, at 872 (suggesting that Kitch’s theory may make 
sense in principle, but not in practice). 
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coordinate further development.40 Second, prospect theory 
overestimates what companies know about each other’s patents. Most 
companies do not look for or know about the existence of patents that 
may affect them.41 Furthermore, many patent holders now deliberately 
lie-in-wait to assert their patents so that they can “holdup” the accused 
infringers.42 Because of the failure of patent law’s notice function, 
patents do not avoid duplicative efforts. Of course these characteristics 
primarily describe the high-tech industry where thousands of patented 
inventions can be found in a single product.43 
Thus, this Article starts with the proposition that overly broad 
claims, particularly in the high-tech industry, are a problem that needs 
to be addressed. But the law also needs to be careful not to narrow 
claims too far. Issuing very narrow claims has its problems too. If claims 
were limited to the embodiment disclosed in the specification, others 
could make minor changes to the invention and avoid infringement.44 
That would devalue patents and under incentivize all inventors. For 
years the courts have struggled to balance these concerns and limit 
claim breadth appropriately. In effect, patent law needs to constrain 
claim scope so that it does not depart too far from the specification (as 
shown in the left of Figure 2) without limiting claims to the described 
embodiments and their most trivial variations (as shown in the right of 
Figure 2). 
 
 40 John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 442 
(2004) (“[T]he holder of a broad prospect patent covering an entire field of technology cannot 
stop another inventor from searching for, and patenting, improvements to the technology.”). 
Duffy does suggest that early prospect patents may have different benefits than Kitch identified. 
They channel rivalry so that patents expire earlier and thereby diminish monopoly rents. Id. at 
444. 
 41 FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND 
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 80–81 (Mar. 2011) [hereinafter FTC, THE EVOLVING IP 
MARKETPLACE], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-
ip-marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/110307
patentreport.pdf (explaining how the notice function of patents appears to work in the 
pharmaceutical industry but fails in the information technology industry); Mark A. Lemley, 
Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21 (“[B]oth researchers and companies in 
component industries simply ignore patents.”). 
 42 FTC, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 41, at 52–53 (explaining how ex post 
transactions overcompensate patent holders and thereby harm competition). 
 43 But if we look at industries with products that are covered by a small number of patents 
(e.g., the pharmaceutical industry), it is unclear that there is much follow-on innovation to 
manage. To be fair, broad patent rights in the pharmaceutical industry would probably deter 
others from pursuing duplicative research. 
 44 See Collins, supra note 13, at 496; see also Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. 
Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) (“[C]ourts have . . . recognized that to permit imitation of a 
patented invention which does not copy every literal detail would be to convert the protection 
of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing.”); Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 
429 F.3d 1052, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (suggesting that if patents were limited to the 
embodiments they disclosed, the patents “would rapidly become worthless as new modes of 
practicing the invention developed, and the inventor would lose the benefit of the patent 
bargain”). 
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B.     Unclear Claims 
The problem of intentionally broad claims is compounded by the 
existence of unclear claims. Interpreting claims is not easy. Describing 
the boundaries of an invention is far more difficult than describing the 
boundaries of real property. After all, real property boundaries can use 
objective measurements while claims try to capture the essence of an 
invention with language.45 This problem is made worse by attorneys. 
Now you might think that good attorneys would try to avoid drafting 
unclear claims.46 Unfortunately, attorneys are incentivized to do just the 
opposite. I have heard more than once that patent attorneys should draft 
claims to give their client maximum flexibility. That means drafting 
claims that are intentionally vague.47 
Another feature of the law that makes patent claims even less 
certain is claim interpretation or claim construction. Claim 
interpretation is a process whereby courts provide definitions for key 
 
 45 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, 
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 55 (2008) (“[I]t is much more complicated to map the 
boundaries of a technology from a verbal description than it is to map a plot of land using a 
standardized surveyor’s description.”). 
 46 See, e.g., Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent Interpretation, 68 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1737, 1810 (2011) (arguing that patentees should be required to include explicit 
definitions of claim terms). 
 47 Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1753 (“[M]any applicants don’t specify what they mean 
by ambiguous technical language, either because they don’t think about the issue or because 
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phrases and words from the claims of the patent.48 Ideally, the 
definitions or “claim constructions” clarify the meaning of the claims in 
a manner that helps resolve the dispute.49 Almost every patent case 
involves a dispute over the meaning of the claims.50 Indeed, local patent 
rules often recommend that courts conduct a hearing specifically to 
interpret claims.51 
In 2005, an en banc panel of the Federal Circuit attempted to set 
forth a methodology that would make claim interpretation more 
predictable.52 The Phillips v. AWH Corp. decision valued intrinsic 
evidence (e.g., the claims, specification, and prosecution history) over 
extrinsic evidence (e.g., dictionaries and expert testimony).53 
Consequently, claims are now supposed to be interpreted primarily 
based on context (i.e., how the inventor used the terms); the plain 
meaning of a term is relevant, but given less weight.54 Despite the 
Phillips decision, courts (including the Federal Circuit itself) either will 
not or cannot apply these principles consistently across different cases.55 
Given the difficulties with claim construction, it is not surprising 
that outcomes continue to be very unpredictable. There is a high claim 
construction reversal rate. In a study of Federal Circuit decisions, David 
Schwartz has found that “38.2% of cases had at least one term wrongly 
construed.”56 “Moreover, 29.7% of the cases had to be reversed, vacated, 
and/or remanded because of an erroneous claim construction.”57 Since 
Schwartz’s study, Jonas Anderson and Peter Menell have reported that 
reversal rates have decreased with around 29.5% of Federal Circuit 
decisions reversing at least one term.58 This corresponded to a remand, 
reversal, or vacation in 23.1% of cases.59 However, they do not attribute 
this improvement to increased clarity in the law. Rather, they suggest 
 
 48 Since claim interpretation is a legal issue, the courts must perform this task. Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996). 
 49 See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (“[T]he construction of claims is simply a way of elaborating the normally terse claim 
language: in order to understand and explain, but not to change, the scope of the claims.”), 
overruled on other grounds by Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
 50 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1744. 
 51 See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Patent L.R. 4-1 to 4-7 (2009) (section titled “Claim Construction 
Proceedings”), available at http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/localrules/patent. 
 52 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 53 Id. at 1314–19. 
 54 Christopher A. Cotropia, What is the “Invention”?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1855, 1868 
(2012) (describing Phillips as a “specification-influenced claim interpretation methodology” as 
opposed to one relying on dictionaries). 
 55 See infra notes 109–12 and accompanying text. 
 56 Schwartz, supra note 6, at 248. 
 57 Id. at 249. 
 58 J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and 
Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 39 (2014). 
 59 Id. 
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that the Federal Circuit has been applying a level of unstated deference 
to district court claim construction rulings.60 If Anderson and Menell 
are correct, parties are not much better off. They still will be unable to 
predict district court rulings with reasonable certainty. Figure 3 below 
depicts the uncertain scope of the patents. The area depicted in grey 
reflects the unknown. Until a patent is litigated, it is unclear whether 
this subject matter is covered by a patent’s claims. 
Figure 3 
This uncertainty burdens innovation in several ways. When claim 
scope is uncertain, there is always the possibility that the claim will be 
interpreted too broadly. In other words, competitors do not just have to 
worry about stepping inside the boundaries protected by a patent’s 
claims; they must worry about stepping near those boundaries too.61 As 
a result, companies may end up foregoing technology that is not actually 
covered by a patent. In these cases, no one wins. The company does not 
get to use its preferred technology. The patentee does not receive any 
royalties. More importantly, society loses too. A company’s decision to 
forego technology will likely cause its product to become less desirable 
or more expensive. 
Alternatively, uncertainty may cause companies to take licenses for 
patents that they do not need. This result is problematic too. These costs 
unnecessarily burden innovation. Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro have 
argued that uncertainty even contributes to systematic over-
compensation in the patent system.62 They created an economic model 
 
 60 Id. at 52. 
 61 FTC, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 41, at 78 (“When patents provide 
poor notice of their scope, the resulting uncertainty may force a firm to incur these costs 
unnecessarily for patents that would not be held to cover their product, burdening innovative 
activities and raising prices.”). 
 62 Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
1991, 2017–25 (2007). 
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that calculates what royalty rates parties will negotiate. The model used 
the term “patent strength” to represent the likelihood that a patent was 
valid and infringed.63 Lemley and Shapiro concluded that in some 
scenarios the negotiated royalty rate “does not involve any discounting 
based on patent strength.”64 In other words, competitors often assume 
that patents will be interpreted broadly and do not discount for the 
possibility that the patent will be given a narrower construction or be 
found to be invalid. Especially for weak patents (i.e., narrow or invalid 
patents), this results in systematic overcompensation.65 
Uncertainty also increases transaction costs. Simply trying to assess 
the boundaries of a patent before litigation is expensive.66 When 
companies roll the dice and let the courts tell them if the technology 
they are using is covered by another’s patent, the price is even higher.67 
Moreover, by the time a company even learns about a patent, there may 
already be significant sunk costs. Retooling a product to avoid future 
infringement often costs far more than designing a non-infringing 
product in the first instance. 
This Article tries to address the problems caused by overbroad and 
unclear claims. But the proposal does not try to fix the doctrines that 
limit claims and make them more predictable. Instead it assumes that 
substantial uncertainty surrounding these doctrines is inevitable. 
Indeed, each of the different claim-limiting doctrines can be thought to 
produce a probability distribution. The closer the subject matter is to 
what the patent describes, the more likely the claim is either infringed or 
valid. In Part II, this Article describes each of these different doctrines 
and illustrates how unpredictable they are. 
 
 63 Id. at 1996–97. 
 64 Id. at 2004. 
 65 Id. at 1993. Thus, Lemley and Shapiro suggest that patent holders actually benefit from 
uncertainty. But uncertainty can also cost patent holders. When patent rights are uncertain, 
some companies will undoubtedly escape liability even when they should be found liable for 
infringement. 
 66 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 45, at 55 (“[A] legal ‘opinion letter’ on a technology 
typically costs about . . . $20,000 to $100,000[].”); FTC, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra 
note 41, at 77 (“[W]hen the notice function is poorly served, the costs of identifying and 
analyzing relevant patents can be onerous.”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-
465, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT 
LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 28 (2013), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657103.pdf (“[U]ncertainty of a patent’s scope . . . usually needs 
to be resolved in court . . . .”). 
 67 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 45, at 70 (“The cost of clearance ratchets up even more 
when patents have fuzzy boundaries . . . .”). 
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II.     TRADITIONAL SAFEGUARDS 
Modern patent law has traditionally looked to the enablement 
requirement and claim interpretation to reign in claims that depart too 
far from the specification. More recently, the written description 
requirement has also been used to tap down on overly broad claims. 
Some commentators have suggested that subject matter patentability 
and the reverse doctrine of equivalents should also be used to curb 
broad claims. This section reviews each of these doctrines. To varying 
degrees of effectiveness, these doctrines all provide some limits on broad 
claiming. But these doctrines are relatively crude. The results are always 
binary; most of these doctrines result in a claim being found valid or 
invalid.68 In the case of claim construction and the reverse doctrine of 
equivalents, the outcome is infringement or non-infringement. But the 
effect is the same; there is a winner or a loser with no middle ground. 
This problem is exacerbated by the complexity of these doctrines. 
Consequently, parties cannot predict whether they will win or lose. 
A.     Enablement 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, the specification of a patent must describe 
“the manner and process of making and using [the invention], in such 
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the 
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to 
make and use . . . the invention.”69 This requirement is satisfied when a 
person of ordinary skill in the art, after reading the specification, could 
practice the claimed invention without undue experimentation.70 The 
enablement requirement serves two functions.71 First, it requires the 
inventor to inform the public how to practice the invention. Second, 
and more importantly for purposes of the current analysis, it serves to 
constrain the permissible scope of claims.72 
Historically, the enablement doctrine has primarily limited broad 
claims in the so-called unpredictable arts (e.g., chemicals and the life 
 
 68 See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Constitution of Patent Law: The Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals and the Shape of the Federal Circuit’s Jurisprudence, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 843, 883 
(2010) (noting that the patent law’s binary inquiries are not “optimal instrument[s]” for 
making policy).  
 69 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
 70 See Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(“Enablement . . . is not precluded even if some experimentation is necessary, although the 
amount of experimentation needed must not be unduly extensive . . . .”). 
 71 CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 87 (2d ed. 2011). 
 72 Id. 
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sciences).73 For example, claims directed at “all possible genetic 
sequences that have EPO-like activity” were found not to be enabled 
when the specification only disclosed how to make one gene and a 
handful of analogs.74 Similarly, a claim directed toward a vaccine on all 
pathogenic RNA viruses was invalidated when the specification only 
disclosed a vaccine that conferred immunity in chickens against one 
type of RNA tumor virus.75 
But enablement law is both confusing and badly fractured. To 
determine whether a broad claim in the unpredictable arts is properly 
enabled, the eight Wands factors must be considered.76 Of course, an 
eight-factor test is not conducive to yielding consistent results. To make 
matters worse, the Federal Circuit cannot agree on how to handle 
patents in the predictable arts (e.g., mechanical and electrical 
technology). Earlier decisions applied a simple rule. They suggest that a 
claim in the predictable arts is enabled when the specification describes 
a single embodiment that falls within the scope of that claim.77 While 
the “single embodiment rule” is easy to apply, it does little to curb broad 
claims because the boundaries of the claim can be quite distant from the 
single embodiment described by the specification.78 
Several recent decisions in the predictable arts have ignored the 
single embodiment rule and applied the new “full scope rule.”79 Under 
the full scope rule, every embodiment that falls within the scope of the 
 
 73 See Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
127, 137 (2008) (“[T]he judiciary has required more detailed disclosure in chemistry and the 
experimental sciences.”); see, e.g., In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (“In cases 
involving unpredictable factors, such as most chemical reactions and physiological activity, the 
scope of enablement obviously varies inversely with the degree of unpredictability of the factors 
involved.”). 
 74 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 75 In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1560–62 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 76 See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The factors are: 
(1) [T]he quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or 
guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature 
of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, 
(7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims. 
Id. 
 77 See Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“If an 
invention pertains to an art where the results are predictable, e.g., mechanical as opposed to 
chemical arts, a broad claim can be enabled by disclosure of a single embodiment . . . .”); see 
also Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1070–71 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (even 
applying the single embodiment rule in the unpredictable arts); Engel Indus. v. Lockformer Co., 
946 F.2d 1528, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Vickers, 141 F.2d 522, 527 (C.C.P.A. 1944). 
 78 This Article adopts the nomenclature from my previous article on enablement. See 
Bernard Chao, Rethinking Enablement in the Predictable Arts: Fully Scoping the New Rule, 2009 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 56, available at http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/chao-rethinking-
enablement.pdf (discussing the different enablement standards applied by the Federal Circuit). 
 79 See Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Auto. Techs. Int’l, 
Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. 
Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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claim must be enabled. For example, in Automotive Technologies 
International, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., the Federal Circuit 
found that claims that generally encompassed both electronic and 
mechanical side impact sensors were not enabled when the specification 
described the mechanical sensors in detail but only provided a 
conceptual diagram of an electronic sensor.80 Although the “full scope” 
rule is clearly designed to address overly broad claims, it is unworkable. 
There is always an unforeseen embodiment that falls within a claim.81 In 
many cases, that embodiment will not be enabled. But a claim should 
not be invalidated simply because the inventor did not foresee every 
embodiment that may eventually fall within its scope. 
Currently, there are four different conflicting enablement 
standards that have support in Federal Circuit case law: the Wands 
factors, the single embodiment rule, the full scope rule, and a blended 
rule that depends on whether the patent is in the predictable or 
unpredictable arts.82 This state of affairs has been described as “doctrinal 
chaos.”83 Parties have little sense of what the enablement doctrine would 
permit a claim to reach.84 Enablement’s unpredictability is aggravated 
by the fact that there can be only two outcomes. A claim is either valid 
or invalid.85 The result is a system of winners and losers. 
B.     Written Description 
The written description requirement has recently emerged as 
another potential tool to reign in overly broad claims.86 Like the 
enablement requirement, the written description requirement is rooted 
in 35 U.S.C § 112. The relevant passage says that “[t]he specification 
 
 80 Auto. Techs., 501 F.3d at 1285. 
 81 Chao, supra note 78, at 89 (“[T]he full scope rule allows defendants to identify any 
embodiment and try to prove that the patent does not enable it.”); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The 
Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 
1175 (2008) (“Due to the infinite scope of patent claims, a patentee certainly need not, and in 
most instances cannot, enable every embodiment falling within the ‘full scope’ of the claims.”). 
 82 See Chao, supra note 78, at 50–55 (describing the different standards). 
 83 Kevin Emerson Collins, Enabling After-Arising Technology, 34 J. CORP. L. 1083, 1085–89 
(2009). 
 84 Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 537–38 (2010) (noting 
that this problem also exists with respect to the written description doctrine discussed in the 
following section). 
 85 But see Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 157–60 
(2006) (arguing that enablement principles should be used to interpret claims and thereby curb 
unduly broad claims). Although Holbrook would use enablement principles to narrow the 
scope of the claim, this proposal also still only has two results—a finding of infringement or 
non-infringement. 
 86 Stephen McJohn, Top Tens in 2011: Patent and Trademark Cases, 10 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 313, 320 (2012) (“The written description requirement acts as a safeguard against 
overbroad claims.”). 
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shall contain a written description of the invention.”87 Until recently, it 
was unclear whether this doctrine required the specification to provide 
any disclosure beyond what was already required to enable the claimed 
invention.88 In Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., an en banc 
panel of the Federal Circuit answered that question by stating that the 
written description and enablement requirements were separate and 
distinct.89 To satisfy the written description requirement, the 
specification “must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to 
recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.”90 Ariad went on 
to explain that this requirement “ensures that when a patent claims a 
genus by its function or result, the specification recites sufficient 
materials to accomplish that function.”91 In other words, the written 
description requirement guards against claims that depart too far from 
the invention actually found in the specification. 
There are two notable differences between the written description 
and enablement requirements. First, the enablement requirement 
assesses whether the specification adequately teaches others while the 
written description requirement assesses whether the specification 
demonstrates that the patentee was in possession of his invention at the 
time the application was filed.92 Thus, the two requirements are 
evaluated from slightly different perspectives. Second, enablement is a 
question of law with underlying factual issues93 and the written 
description is a question of fact.94 Courts will decide whether a claim is 
valid under the enablement requirement while juries will decide if the 
claim satisfies the written description requirement. 
Despite these differences, there are serious doubts whether the 
written description requirement will provide any significant new 
limitations on broad claims.95 Even if the requirements are distinct, the 
 
 87 35 U.S.C § 112(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 88 See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“The issue of whether patent 
law contains a separate written description requirement has percolated through various panels 
of this court, on a variety of facts.”). 
 89 Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). The 
written description requirement has traditionally been used to prevent the late claiming of new 
matter (i.e., to prevent patent applicants from adding new inventions to an older disclosure). 
The question in Ariad was whether the requirement also applied to originally filed claims. 
 90 Id. at 1351 (alteration in original) (quoting Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 
1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 91 Id. at 1352. 
 92 See Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (asking whether the 
application “reasonably convey[s] to one of skill in the art that the inventor possessed 
the []claimed subject matter at the time the [patent] application was filed”). 
 93 AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 94 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. 
 95 Numerous judges argued that a separate written description requirement was not 
justified on policy grounds. See id. at 1360 (Gajarsa, J., concurring); id. at 1372 (Rader & Linn, 
JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
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enablement defense already guards against overly broad claims in much 
the same way that the written description requirement does. They both 
measure the breadth of the claims against the specification, albeit with 
slightly different perspectives in mind. Studies also suggest that a 
separate written description requirement will not have much effect. 
Dennis Crouch reviewed Board of Patent Appeals and Interference 
patent opinions and “found that none of the outcomes of those 
decisions would have been impacted by a legal change that entirely 
eliminated the written description requirement of § 112.”96 Earlier, 
Chris Holman came to the same conclusion in a study of both federal 
courts and PTO decisions.97 Holman only identified nine original claims 
that were rejected for lacking written description and concluded that 
each of those rejected claims was, or “could have easily been,” held 
invalid for lacking enablement.98 The Ariad court was aware of these 
studies and admitted that the enablement and written description 
requirements “often rise and fall together.”99 
Thus, it seems unlikely that the written description requirement 
will reign in broad claims beyond what the enablement requirement 
already has. What is more, there is no reason to believe that the written 
description will be any easier to apply than the enablement 
requirement.100 Thus, like enablement, the binary outcomes will result 
in big winners and losers. 
C.     Claim Interpretation 
Claim interpretation can also safeguard against overly broad 
claims.101 Defendants typically ask courts to adopt a narrow claim 
interpretation that closely tracks the embodiments disclosed in the 
specification. By interpreting claims in light of the specification, 
defendants are able to find support for these narrow interpretations.102 
In response, patentees point out that claims are not limited to the 
 
 96 Dennis Crouch, An Empirical Study of the Role of the Written Description Requirement in 
Patent Examination, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1665, 1667 (2010). This conclusion assumed that the 
Patent Office would still “reject claims based on the addition of ‘new matter.’” Id. 
 97 Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A Comprehensive 
Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and Its Progeny in the Courts and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & 
TECH. 1, 78 (2007). 
 98 Id. at 71. 
 99 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352. 
 100 See Chiang, supra note 84. 
 101 See Stephen McJohn, Scary Patents, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 343, 367 (2009). 
 102 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also United 
States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 49 (1966) (“[I]t is fundamental that claims are to be construed in 
the light of the specifications and both are to be read with a view to ascertaining the invention.” 
(citations omitted)). 
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preferred embodiments and a broader interpretation is warranted.103 
Since both principles are well supported in the law, judges can justify a 
broader or narrower interpretation by simply relying on the appropriate 
principle. Indeed, this “classic” claim construction dispute occurs all the 
time. Decisions repeatedly discuss the fine line between impermissibly 
importing limitations from the specification and appropriately 
interpreting a claim in light of the specification.104 
This problem was recently highlighted in Retractable Technologies, 
Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.105 The patent at issue related to medical 
syringes that contained a needle that retracted into the syringe body 
after use and thereby lowered the risk of later accidental needle sticks. 
The disputed claim term was “body.” The defendant argued that “body” 
was limited to a one-piece structure, but the district court rejected that 
view.106 The defendant appealed this ruling to the Federal Circuit. 
Writing for the majority, Judge Lourie focused on the fact that the 
specification only disclosed one-piece structure syringe bodies and 
distinguished prior syringes that were made of multiple pieces. By 
interpreting the claims in light of the specification, the majority was able 
to conclude that the term “body” was limited to a single-piece 
structure.107 
Chief Judge Rader dissented. He argued that the plain meaning of 
body is not limited to a single-piece structure.108 Chief Judge Rader also 
pointed out that some of the patent’s other claims specifically limited 
the body to a one-piece barrel. These claims suggested that, by itself, 
body was not limited to a single-piece structure.109 Finally, unlike the 
 
 103 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (“[C]laims may embrace ‘different subject matter than is 
illustrated in the specific embodiments in the specification.’” (quoting Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc. 
v. ARM Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005))); see, e.g., Comaper Corp. v. 
Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (refusing to limit the term “case” to the sole 
embodiment of an “enclosed” case in the specification). 
 104 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (“[W]e recognize that the distinction between using the 
specification to interpret the meaning of a claim and importing limitations from the 
specification into the claim can be a difficult one to apply in practice.”); Comark Commc’ns, 
Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186–87 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[T]here is sometimes a fine line 
between reading a claim in light of the specification, and reading a limitation into the claim 
from the specification.”). 
 105 Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. (Retractable I), 653 F.3d 1296 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011). 
 106 See id. at 1304. 
 107 Id. at 1304–05. 
 108 Id. at 1312 (Rader, C.J., dissenting in part). 
 109 Id. at 1311–13. Under the doctrine of claim differentiation, “the presence of a dependent 
claim that adds a particular limitation gives rise to a presumption that the limitation in 
question is not present in the independent claim.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. But see Digital-
Vending Servs. Int’l, LLC v. Univ. of Phx., Inc., 672 F.3d 1270, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Moore, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he doctrine of claim differentiation does not serve to broaden claims beyond 
their meaning . . . in light of the specification.” (first alteration in original) (quoting Toro Co. v. 
White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). 
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majority, Chief Judge Rader found nothing in the specification that 
contradicted the broad, plain meaning of body. Consequently, he 
concluded that the majority was improperly importing limitations from 
the specification.110 The patentee filed a petition to have the entire 
Federal Circuit rehear the issue. Although the petition was rejected, 
Judge Moore joined Chief Judge Rader in dissent arguing that the 
majority’s opinion impermissibly changed the plain meaning of “body” 
to tailor the scope of the patent to what the panel believes was the 
“actual invention.”111 In the end, two Federal Circuit judges concluded 
that “body” was limited to a single-piece structure and two others 
concluded that it could encompass multiple pieces. Retractable 
Technologies illustrates how judges that regularly construe claims can 
select different rules to justify different claim scope. Unfortunately, this 
kind of dispute happens regularly in patent law.112 
Judges do not just struggle with claim breadth. There are many 
other doctrines that make claims construction unpredictable. 
Determining the meaning of patent claims requires a judge to break the 
text of a claim into discrete “elements.” But it is unclear how to 
determine what part of a claim is an element.113 Moreover, the scope of a 
claim can change over time.114 Finally, there is the problem of 
“metaconstruction.”115 Even after courts interpret a claim, parties often 
fight over the meaning of the courts’ new definitions.116 Consequently, 
parties do not know how far a given patent’s claims extend. Moreover, 
like every doctrine discussed here, there are binary outcomes. While 
other doctrines lead to findings of validity or invalidity, a claim 
construction decision generally results in findings of infringement or 
non-infringement. 
 
 110 Retractable I, 653 F.3d at 1311–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting in part). 
 111 Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. (Retractable II), 659 F.3d 1369, 1372 
(Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 112 See Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 NW. U. L. REV 
1097, 1109 (2011) (“Contradictory doctrine makes claim construction outcomes difficult to 
predict without litigation, and judicial disagreement frequently arises when such issues are 
litigated.”); Cotropia, supra note 54, at 1870 (“Opinions after Phillips switch between 
methodologies; some rely mainly on the claim language’s plain meaning whereas others depend 
heavily on the specification’s text and drawings.”). 
 113 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
29, 31 (2005) (“[T]here are no hard and fast standards in the law by which to make the ‘right’ 
decision as to either the size of the textual element or the level of abstraction at which the 
element will be evaluated.”). 
 114 See Collins, supra note 13, at 510 (explaining how claims regularly expand to cover after 
arising technology). 
 115 Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1760. 
 116 Id. 
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D.     Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents 
Theoretically, the reverse doctrine of equivalents could operate as 
some form of check on overly broad claims. The reverse doctrine of 
equivalents is an equitable doctrine designed “to prevent unwarranted 
extension of the claims beyond a fair scope of the patentee’s 
invention.”117 The Supreme Court has said that it applies “where a 
device is so far changed in principle from a patented article that it 
performs the same or a similar function in a substantially different way, 
but nevertheless falls within the literal words of the claim.”118 
Yet, the reverse doctrine of equivalents is disfavored by the courts. 
In fact, in Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Resources, 
Inc., the Federal Circuit declared that the doctrine did not survive the 
Patent Act of 1952.119 Tate Access overstates the demise of the reverse 
doctrine of equivalents. The doctrine is rarely seen in practice.120 But 
there are Federal Circuit decisions that have considered the reverse 
doctrine of equivalents since 1952121 and commentators have labeled 
Tate Access’s pronouncement regarding the doctrine as dicta.122 The 
reverse doctrine of equivalents has far greater respect in the academic 
community. Numerous commentators have mentioned its importance 
 
 117 Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 
1991), overruled on other grounds by Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 118 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608–09 (1950). 
 119 Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (“Not once has this court affirmed a decision finding noninfringement based on the 
reverse doctrine of equivalents. And with good reason: when Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 112, 
after the decision in Graver Tank, it imposed requirements for the written description, 
enablement, definiteness, and means-plus-function claims that are co-extensive with the 
broadest possible reach of the reverse doctrine of equivalents.”). But see Scripps, 927 F.2d at 
1581 (finding a factual issue with respect to the reverse doctrine of equivalents and reversing 
summary judgment of infringement). 
 120 Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 531 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The reverse 
doctrine of equivalents is rarely applied, and this court has never affirmed a finding of non-
infringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents.” (citing Tate Access, 279 F.3d at 1368)). 
 121 See, e.g., DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1339 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (finding that defendant should not be sanctioned for raising a reverse doctrine of 
equivalents defense); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1351 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) (considering but rejecting the defendant’s reverse doctrine of equivalents defense on 
the merits); Scripps, 927 F.2d at 1581. 
 122 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1174 n.122. 
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and called for its use.123 To date, the courts have not responded to those 
calls.124 
But even if the reverse doctrine of equivalents were to be revived, it 
also yields only two outcomes. Either the patentee wins and there is 
infringement, or the accused infringer wins and there is none. The 
current law does not reduce the remedy simply because there was a 
good, albeit losing, reverse doctrine of equivalents defense. 
E.     Subject Matter Patentability 
Section 101 of the Patent Act broadly defines patentable subject 
matter as “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”125 
Although the legislative history of the Patent Act suggested that 
“anything under the sun that is made by man” is patent eligible,126 the 
courts have created exceptions.127 “[L]aws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not eligible to be patented.128 
Surprisingly, the issue of claim scope has emerged as an important 
factor in determining when claims cover one of these unpatentable 
concepts. 
An invention is not unpatentable simply because it includes an 
unpatentable concept.129 “[A]n application of a law of nature or 
mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be 
deserving of patent protection.”130 Just in 2012, in Mayo Collaborative 
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., the Supreme Court suggested 
that when a claim adds “enough” to an unpatentable concept to change 
it into an application, the claim is patent eligible.131 Unfortunately, the 
 
 123 See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS 
CAN SOLVE IT 128 (2009); Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a 
Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 118‒19 (2004); Holbrook, supra note 5, at 12–15; Lemley, 
supra note 5, at 1010–13; Merges & Nelson, supra note 35, at 856–66. 
 124 Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REV. 379, 399 n.82 
(2012) (“Parties in fourteen appeals raised the reverse doctrine of equivalents between 2001 and 
2010.”). 
 125 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 126 S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952). 
 127 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
 128 Id.; see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (saying that a mathematical 
expression is simply a “scientific truth” and unpatentable). 
 129 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981). 
 130 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 131 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2012) 
(framing the issue in Mayo as whether “the patent claims add enough to their statements of the 
[natural law] to allow the processes they describe to qualify as patent-eligible processes that 
apply natural laws”). 
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Mayo decision did not provide a framework that explains how to 
determine what enough is.132 
Instead, the Supreme Court simply gave a few examples of what 
was not enough to render a claim patentable. For example, Mayo said 
that overly broad claims that do no more than “apply the algorithm” are 
unpatentable.133 Previous decisions had already warned that a claim 
cannot preempt all the applications of a law of nature, physical 
phenomenon, or abstract idea.134 If assessing subject matter 
patentability were as simple as just examining claim breadth, the 
doctrine would probably become more certain. Mark Lemley, Michael 
Risch, Ted Sichelman, and R. Polk Wagner proposed precisely this kind 
of framework in 2011.135 But in Mayo, the Supreme Court already 
appears to have rejected their proposal.136 
Instead the Court looked at many different factors without 
explaining how they fit together. First, the Supreme Court found that 
adding three types of limitations do not make an unpatentable concept 
patentable: “(1) limiting an unpatentable concept to a particular 
audience, (2) telling someone about the concept, or (3) adding a 
conventional or obvious [pre-solution] activity.”137 The decision also 
compared the invention in Mayo to the inventions in Parker v. Flook138 
and Diamond v. Diehr,139 earlier Supreme Court cases on patentable 
subject matter. Without any real explanation, Mayo concluded that the 
invention at issue was closer to Flook and therefore unpatentable.140 But 
the patents in these two cases appear to cover very similar inventions 
making it even more difficult to understand how to apply the law of 
subject matter patentability.141 
 
 132 See Bernard Chao, Moderating Mayo, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 423 (2012) (critiquing Mayo 
and proposing a framework for determining when additional limitations render an 
unpatentable concept patent eligible); Michael Risch, Patentable Subject Matter, the Supreme 
Court, and Me, MADISONIAN.NET (Mar. 20, 2012), http://madisonian.net/2012/03/20/
patentable-subject-matter-the-supreme-court-and-me (complaining about how difficult it will 
be to determine what detail needs to be added). 
 133 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301–02 (characterizing both the claims in Mayo and Benson, 409 
U.S. at 71, as overly broad). 
 134 Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72; O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–20 (1853). 
 135 See Mark A. Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted Sichelman & R. Polk Wagner, Life After Bilski, 
63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1317, 1339–41 (2011) (proposing that subject matter patentability should 
be recast as a five-factor test for overclaiming). 
 136 See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303 (citing Lemley, Risch, Sichelman & Wagner, supra note 135, 
and responding that “our cases have not distinguished among different laws of nature 
according to whether or not the principles they embody are sufficiently narrow”). 
 137 Chao, supra, note 132, at 429. 
 138 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
 139 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 140 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1299–300. 
 141 See Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60 SMU L. REV. 317, 349 (2007) 
(“Flook and Diehr are difficult to reconcile.”); Horacio E. Gutiérrez, Peering Through the Cloud: 
The Future of Intellectual Property and Computing, 20 FED. CIR. B.J. 589, 590 (2011) (noting 
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Compounding the confusion, before Mayo, the belief was that the 
machine-or-transformation test was the primary mechanism for 
determining subject matter patentability.142 Under this test, a process 
was only patentable if it was tied to a particular machine or transformed 
an article to another state. Of course there were problems with this test. 
For example, it was unclear whether the test applied exclusively to 
process patents.143 Moreover, no one knows what types of computers, if 
any, can qualify as a “specific machine.”144 The Supreme Court muddied 
the waters even further when the Mayo decision appeared to diminish 
the test’s importance.145 
Simply put, subject matter patentability has never been more 
uncertain than after Mayo. Many patents in the biotechnology, medical 
diagnostics, and software industries have an unpatentable concept at 
their core. But after Mayo, it is unclear whether these patents have 
added “enough” to the claims to render them patent eligible.146 The 
Supreme Court recently attempted to provide some clarity for the 
biotechnology industry in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc.147 Relying on the rule against patenting “naturally 
occurring things,” the Court held that claims drawn to isolated genomic 
DNA did not cover patent eligible subject matter.148 However, the Court 
distinguished claims drawn to complementary DNA (cDNA) because 
cDNA is not naturally occurring.149 Thus, after Myriad, isolated DNA 
claims are not patent-eligible but cDNA claims are. But the analysis 
underlying these two results is still unclear. After all, isolated genomic 
DNA does not actually occur in nature. Chemical bonds must first be 
severed. Thus, Myriad suggests that some structural differences are 
 
that Diehr and Flook had “very similar facts” with opposite results); Mark A. Lemley, Point of 
Novelty, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1253, 1278 (2011) (characterizing the claims in Diehr and Flook as 
“almost exactly parallel”). 
 142 See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) (stating that “the machine-or-
transformation test is a useful and important clue [or] investigative tool,” but it “is not the sole 
test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process’” under § 101); Chao, supra 
note 132, at 427 (“Unfortunately, the Court did not identify other tests that should be used, and 
the lower courts continue to rely on the machine-or-transformation test while rotely noting 
that it is not the only test.”). 
 143 See Lemley, Risch, Sichelman & Wagner, supra note 135, at 1322–23 (discussing the 
ambiguities in the machine-or-transformation test). 
 144 See id. 
 145 See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303 (“[I]n stating that the ‘machine-or-transformation’ test is an 
‘important and useful clue’ to patentability, we have neither said nor implied that the test 
trumps the ‘law of nature’ exclusion.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225–
27)). 
 146 See Chao, supra note 132, at 432; Risch, supra note 132. 
 147 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
 148 Id. at 2116–20. 
 149 Id. at 2119. cDNA is a synthetically created exons-only molecule. 
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sufficient to establish patent eligibility while others are not.150 How 
much is unclear. Christopher Holman identifies a number of 
technologies that fall within this netherworld.151 
The question of whether and what software is patent eligible is even 
more confusing. In 2013, the Federal Circuit attempted to address 
whether adding computer limitations to an otherwise unpatentable 
concept could render software patents eligible.152 Unfortunately, the 
judges could not find common ground and the decision contained seven 
separate opinions reflecting at least three distinct approaches.153 Just 
recently, the Supreme Court has agreed to take up CLS Bank 
International v. Alice Corp.154 Hopefully, the Court will provide clearer 
guidance. Thus, some of the most fundamental questions of patent 
eligibility are now in a state of flux. Although the courts are trying to 
provide greater clarity to the doctrine, so far they have failed. For now, 
subject matter patentability remains part of the large list of patent law 
doctrines that are difficult to apply and have only two outcomes, valid 
or invalid. 
F.     Flaws with the Current Approaches 
The problem with the current approaches to overly broad claims is 
that they do not account for the different types of infringement that 
exist. These doctrines only allow for two outcomes. The claim either can 
or cannot reach particular subject matter that departs from the patent’s 
specification. In the former case, the claim is infringed and valid. In the 
latter case, the claim is either not infringed and/or invalid. These results 
would make sense if infringement also came in only two flavors. But in 
reality, there are many different types of potential infringement. These 
different types can be thought to fall along an infringement continuum. 
The infringement continuum is simply a reflection of claim 
breadth.155 Returning to Apple’s ‘647 patent, the different examples of 
 
 150 Christopher M. Holman, In Myriad the Supreme Court Has, Once Again, Increased the 
Uncertainty of U.S. Patent Law, 32 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 289, 291–92 (2013) (discussing the 
implicit requirement of significant structural change). But see Arti K. Rai, Biomedical Patents at 
the Supreme Court: A Path Forward, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 111, 112–15 (2013) (discussing 
how both Mayo and Myriad could be interpreted as focusing more explicitly on innovation). 
 151 Holman, supra note 150, at 292–93 (Holman questions whether “a DNA-based gene 
therapy vector based on a naturally occurring DNA sequence” or “monoclonal antibody-based 
drugs” are now patent eligible). 
 152 See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc), cert. granted 
134 S. Ct. 734, 735 (2013). 
 153 See Bernard Chao, Finding the Point of Novelty in Software Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1217 (2013) (discussing CLS Bank and critically reviewing the different tests for 
determining whether software patents are eligible under § 101). 
 154 CLS Bank Int’l, 717 F.3d 1269. 
 155 See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
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claim breadth can be recast as different points along an infringement 
continuum. An infringing product can look precisely like the 
embodiments described in the patent. In the case of the ‘647 patent, a 
personal computer that recognizes a phone number and allows the user 
to automatically dial the number plainly infringes the patent.156 An 
infringing product may also be a minor variation of the disclosed 
embodiment. For example, a personal computer that appends the 
number one before dialing an out of area number would almost 
certainly infringe the patent. This is true even though the specification 
never mentioned prepending the number one. However, some 
infringements may also look like something totally different and 
unexpected. Smart phones may add unforeseen technology yet infringe 
the patent. Kevin Collins classifies this kind of after-arising technology 
as a “complement” because consumers desire both the original property 
(i.e., recognizing a phone number, calling it, and putting it in an 
electronic phone book) and the new property (i.e., the new smart phone 
features).157 Alternatively, the ‘647 patent may cover unforeseen 
variations like computers that recognize faces in photographs and index 
the photographs accordingly. Collins characterizes technology with this 
property as a “substitute” because it replaces the original property 
disclosed in the patent.158 
Thus, the infringement continuum can be thought of as extending 
in two different dimensions. Along one dimension, new technology may 
change the fundamental nature of the invention. Nonetheless, this new 
technology may still fall within the scope of the patent’s claims. Along 
the second dimension, new technology may arise in ways that are not 
central to the heart of the invention.159 Likewise, this technology may 
also fall within the scope of the patent’s claims. This Article uses Collin’s 
“substitutionary” and “complementary” terminology to describe these 
two dimensions of the infringement continuum. 
 
 156 Claim 15 of the ‘647 patent is probably the simplest and broadest claim. It recites: 
In a computer having a memory storing actions, a method for causing the computer 
to perform an action on a structure identified in computer data, comprising the steps 
of: receiving computer data; detecting a structure in the data; linking at least one 
action to the detected structure; enabling selection of the structure and a linked 
action; and executing the selected action linked to the selected structure. 
U.S. Patent No. 5,946,647 col. 8 l. 22–33 (filed Feb. 1, 1996). 
 157 Kevin Emerson Collins, Getting into the “Spirit” of Innovative Things: Looking to 
Complementary and Substitute Properties to Shape Patent Protection for Improvements, 26 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1217, 1296–97 (2011). 
 158 Id. 
 159 This analysis assumes that claims have a “point of novelty,” a proposition that is not 
uncontroversial. For a discussion explaining why not all claim limitations should be treated 
equally, see generally Bernard Chao, Breaking Aro’s Commandment: Recognizing That 
Inventions Have Heart, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1183 (2010) and Lemley, 
supra note 141. 
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Now many of us may disagree on the proper scope of the ‘647 
patent. Some may suggest that the claims cannot be interpreted to cover 
smart phones or facial recognition technology.160 Others would suggest 
claims that reach that far afield from the specification must fail the 
enablement and written description requirements. One might even 
argue that interpreting the ‘647 patent renders the claim unpatentable 
because it covers an abstract idea—the concept of recognizing 
unformatted data. On the other hand, there are reasonable arguments 
that the ‘647 patent covers each of the examples described above. 
But even if reasonable minds cannot agree on proper claim scope, 
they should be able to agree that some of these infringements should be 
treated differently than others. A company that does precisely what is 
described in the specification owes a greater debt to the patentee than a 
company that modifies the invention in some unforeseen ways or adds 
its own contributions. Relying on this insight, this Article offers a 
different framework that ties disclosure principles to the remedies 
patent law provides. The details of earlier proposals and my proposal 
follow. 
III.     EXISTING PROPOSALS 
My proposal builds on two existing concepts found in the academic 
literature. First, several commentators have argued that the standard for 
determining whether to grant permanent injunctions should consider 
significant differences between the infringement and the patented 
invention. The effect would be to base part of a patentee’s remedy on the 
proximity of the infringement to the patented invention. However, these 
proposals do not allow for much fine tuning because decisions 
regarding permanent injunctions typically result in one of two 
outcomes, a simple denial or grant.161 Second, a different set of 
commentators have suggested that patent law return to a system of 
“central claiming” whereby infringement determinations are made by 
relying on the patent’s specification, and not its claims. In the following 
two sections, I describe these proposals and their potential benefits. I 
then explain why my own proposal improves on the suggestions to 
 
 160 Collins argues that courts should be more permissive in allowing patents to encompass 
complementary after-arising technology (e.g., the smart phone) but less permissive for after-
arising substitutes (e.g., the facial recognition technology). Collins, supra note 157, at 1300–02. 
 161 But see Bernard H. Chao, After eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange: The Changing Landscape for 
Patent Remedies, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 543, 563–64 (2008) (discussing how injunctions can 
be tailored to avoid the patentee overcompensation); John M. Golden, Injunctions as More (or 
Less) than “Off Switches”: Patent-Infringement Injunctions’ Scope, 90 TEX. L. REV 1399, 1455 
(2012) (discussing how courts have occasionally issued “moderated injunctions” that permit 
some types of limited infringing activity). 
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modify the permanent injunction standard and provides different 
advantages than a central claiming system would. 
A.     Adjusting Injunctions 
For many years, courts had automatically awarded prevailing 
patentees a permanent injunction against further infringement. 
However, in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Supreme Court held 
that courts should apply the traditional four-factor test they use in other 
areas of the law.162 Although the first three eBay factors focus on the 
patentee and the infringer, the fourth eBay factor discusses the public 
interest. Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence implicitly recognized 
that there are circumstances when it is against the public interest to 
allow a patent owner to control her invention.163 This discussion 
suggested a shift in focus from one based purely on the property rights 
of patentees to a more public-minded analysis. Several scholars have 
seized upon this opening to offer proposals that would improve the 
public welfare. In one form or another, each of these proposals argues 
that permanent injunctions should not be granted when the infringing 
product looks significantly different from what the inventor described. 
In other words, they all suggest that at least part of the patentee’s 
remedy should depend on where the infringement lies upon the 
infringement continuum. 
Timothy Holbrook has argued that when there is infringement 
under the doctrine of equivalents, the patentee should not be entitled to 
a permanent injunction.164 Holbrook views infringement under this 
doctrine as fundamentally different from literal infringement. Under the 
doctrine of equivalents, an accused infringer that does not literally fall 
within the boundaries of the claim “may nonetheless be found to 
infringe if there is ‘equivalence’ between . . . the accused product or 
process” and elements of the claim.165 
The most common justification underlying the existence of the 
doctrine of equivalents is that it would be unfair to allow someone to 
 
 162 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390–91 (2006). Those factors are: 
(1) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm without the injunction; (2) whether there 
is an adequate remedy at law; (3) the balance of hardships on the respective parties; and 
(4) whether granting an injunction would disservice the public interest. Id. at 391; see also 
Chao, supra note 161, at 549–64 (discussing the emerging trends in applying eBay’s four-factor 
test). 
 163 See eBay, 547 U.S. at 396–97 (“When the patented invention is but a small component of 
the product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply 
for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the 
infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest.”). 
 164 Holbrook, supra note 5, at 46–48. 
 165 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997). 
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escape infringement when she practiced the essence of the invention, 
but for some reason the words of the claim did not happen to cover 
her.166 Of course, there are problems with the doctrine of equivalents 
too. The doctrine makes it more difficult to ascertain a patent’s 
boundaries.167 Parties cannot just analyze the literal language of a 
patent’s claims. They must also determine whether an accused 
component that does not fall within the literal scope of the claim 
matches the function, way, and result of the claimed element or whether 
the component is known to be interchangeable with a claimed 
element.168 
Oddly, the doctrine of equivalents has evolved so that it grants 
greater protection to patent holders for creations that were not 
foreseeable at the time of their patent applications.169 Consequently, 
there can be infringement when the accused device is not found within 
precise boundaries of the claim nor closely connected to the 
embodiments described in the specification.170 That means that an 
inventor “can exclude others from practicing a technology that she did 
not create,” including advancements over the patented invention.171 
Holbrook calls this the “possession paradox.”172 
Under current law, the fact that infringement was under the 
doctrine of equivalents does not affect the remedy. All of patent law’s 
traditional remedies are available to the patent holder, including 
damages and the possibility of a permanent injunction. Holbrook would 
reduce the impact of the “possession paradox” by prohibiting the 
patentee from receiving a permanent injunction when infringement is 
 
 166 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) (explaining 
that without the doctrine of equivalents an inventor would be left “at the mercy of verbalism” 
and the law “would be subordinating substance to form”); see also Holbrook, supra note 5, at 
31–35 (discussing how some justify the doctrine of equivalents on the basis of “[c]laim 
[c]orrection,” “[e]fficiency [g]rounds and [r]efinement [t]heory,” and “[f]airness to the 
[i]nventor”). 
 167 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002). As 
discussed earlier, unclear claims cause the same problems that overbroad claims do because 
companies have to worry that the claims will be interpreted broadly. See supra note 61 and 
accompanying text. 
 168 See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 35–36. 
 169 Holbrook, supra note 5, at 6; see also Festo, 535 U.S. at 740 (holding that prosecution 
history does not bar the application of the doctrine of equivalents when the patentee 
demonstrates that the equivalent in question was unforeseeable at the time of the narrowing 
amendment); Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 101, 120 (2005) (“Indeed, covering equivalent technology not contemplated when the 
patent claims were written is one of the major benefits of the doctrine of equivalents.”). 
 170 See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (en banc) (holding that the doctrine of equivalents does not apply to embodiments 
disclosed in the specification but not claimed). 
 171 Holbrook, supra note 5, at 6. 
 172 Id. at 2, 7. 
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found under the doctrine of equivalents.173 This proposal would still 
leave the patent holder with the ability to recover past damages and an 
ongoing royalty. 
Holbrook’s proposal would modify patent law so that courts could 
respond to broad claims with more than only two results: (1) a patentee 
win, entitling the patentee to the typical array of remedies, or (2) a 
patentee loss. Under Holbrook’s proposal, a patentee could win but be 
denied the ability to obtain a permanent injunction because 
infringement was only found under the doctrine of equivalents. 
Peter Lee is also concerned about broad claims.174 But he does not 
limit his recommendations to the doctrine of equivalents. Lee suggests 
that when significant improvements are found to infringe a patent 
(either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents), the patentee 
should not be entitled to a permanent injunction.175 These are 
improvements that fall within the scope of a patent’s claims but improve 
on the technology in a manner that is not described by the 
specification.176 
Lee explains that holders of broad “blocking” patents may end up 
preventing the commercialization of later improvements. Ideally, when 
patents on an underlying technology and on its improvement are held 
by different parties, the parties will be able to negotiate a cross license. 
However, Lee points out that the parties often fail to arrive at an 
agreement because of high transaction costs or because the holder of the 
blocking patent may seek an undue portion of the rents arising from the 
improvement.177 
To counteract such market failures, Lee looks to property law’s 
accession doctrine for a solution. “According to this doctrine, when an 
innocent party improves someone else’s personal property in a way that 
significantly enhances its value or changes its nature, the improver may 
take title to the improved item, contingent upon compensating the 
original owner for the raw materials.”178 Lee applies the same principles 
to patent law and recommends that courts integrate the accession 
 
 173 Id. at 46. 
 174 See Peter Lee, The Accession Insight and Patent Infringement Remedies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 
175 (2011). 
 175 Id. at 202–03. 
 176 Lee defines both the terms “significant” and “improvement.” First, an improvement 
occurs when a party “creat[es] a technology that serves a similar technical objective as the 
existing invention, but does so with greater efficiency or enhanced functionality.” Id. at 184. 
Second, Lee borrows a definition of “significant” from Mark Lemley. See id. at 185. Lemley 
classifies significant improvements as those that are independently patentable over the original 
patented invention. Lemley, supra note 5, at 1008–10. 
 177 Lee, supra note 174, at 180; see also, Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 62, at 1994–2010 
(discussing how the threat of an injunction can enable a patent holder to negotiate royalties far 
in excess of patent holder’s economic contribution). 
 178 Lee, supra note 174, at 196. 
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insight into the eBay framework for determining whether to issue a 
permanent injunction.179 The result would be to “deny injunctive relief 
when an infringer substantially improves on an underlying patented 
invention.”180 Substantial improvers will still have to pay damages. 
However, the improver will be able to continue to use the patented 
technology by paying the patent holder an ongoing royalty.181 
Finally, Katherine Strandburg also focuses on broad claims that 
block improvements.182 She proposes a multi-faceted patent fair use 
defense.183 One aspect of her proposal places limits on broad claims. 
Specifically, certain classes of infringers would be exempt from liability 
entirely or at least not be subject to permanent injunction.184 Among 
those classes would be those that substantially improve on the patented 
invention.185 Substantiality would be judged by assessing the relative 
sizes of the initial invention and the improvement. Presumably, that 
requires a comparison of the improvement with the patent’s 
specification, not just its claims. Strandburg has two justifications for 
this exemption. First, she compares substantial improvements in patent 
law to transformative uses in copyright law and argues “that the public 
should not be deprived of a major advance because the initial author 
refuses to ‘play along.’”186 Second, like Peter Lee, she points to various 
market failures that prevent the improver from ever receiving a license 
to the dominant patent.187 
I agree with all these proposals as far as they go.188 But the law 
needs to go even further. These proposals only offer one way to adjust 
the remedy. Under the current law, an overly broad claim results in a 
loss for the patentee. If the claim is not too broad, the patentee wins and 
is entitled to all the typical remedies.189 These include money damages 
and the possibility of an injunction. Holbrook’s, Lee’s, and Strandburg’s 
proposals would make the possibility of an injunction dependent on the 
 
 179 Id. at 212–15. 
 180 Id. at 240.  
 181 Id. at 215 (“[C]ourts applying this proposal would generally compel a defendant to pay 
royalties to a pioneer patentee as a condition of ongoing infringement.”). 
 182 See Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 265 (2011). 
 183 Id. at 293–304. 
 184 Id. at 293, 300–01. 
 185 Id. at 297–99. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. at 298–99. 
 188 I am only discussing Strandburg’s weaker proposal—exempting certain types of 
infringers from the possibility of a permanent injunction. Her stronger proposal—a complete 
fair use defense—would not change the number of outcomes. It would narrow the scope of 
broad claims so that they do not cover substantial improvements. 
 189 A win would be a claim construction that encompasses the accused infringer, but does 
not invalidate the relevant claims of the patent. 
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nature of the infringement. Of course these proposals only operate on a 
single policy lever, the permanent injunction.190 
There is no reason why patent law cannot use money damages as 
an additional lever to tune the remedies even more finely. In other 
words, money damages should also depend on how close the infringing 
product is to the invention found in the patent’s specification (i.e., 
where the infringement lies upon the infringement continuum). As 
described in further detail in Part V, that means that a jury would be 
instructed to base the amount of damages on how closely the 
infringement looks like the embodiments described in the specification. 
B.     Central Claiming 
The proposal described in this Article relies on the patent’s 
specification to tune the remedy that a patentee would receive.191 This 
would radically expand the role the specification plays in patent law. 
Under current law, the primary purpose of the specification is to teach 
the public how to use the invention.192 Of course the specification is also 
used to interpret the claims, but the claims delineate the patentee’s 
property rights. However, the general idea of placing more weight on 
the specification is not new. 
In two separate articles, Jeanne Fromer and Dan Burk and Mark 
Lemley have suggested that patent law should focus less on what 
inventors claim and more on what they describe.193 These 
commentators identify a number of problems with our current system 
of “peripheral claiming.”194 They argue that too many resources are 
spent drafting claims and interpreting them.195 What is worse, these 
efforts are often wasted because the claims are unclear and thus fail to 
 
 190 To be fair, injunctions can be tailored providing a limited amount of flexibility. See 
Golden, supra note 161. 
 191 Presumably, the three proposals regarding permanent injunction would also rely on the 
specification and expand its role. For example, even though infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents is based on examining each claim limitation, the specification helps us determine 
whether some other feature that does not fall within the literal scope of that limitation: serves 
the same purpose, has the same function, or achieves the same result. Moreover, assessing 
whether an infringement substantially improves on the patented invention would undoubtedly 
involve looking at the patent’s specification, not just its claims. 
 192 See supra notes 70, 87 and accompanying text (describing the enablement and written 
description requirements). 
 193 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 9; Fromer, supra note 9. 
 194 In the current system, the claims define the outer limit of the patentees’ property right. 
This approach is referred to as “peripheral claiming.” Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1744. 
 195 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1761–65 (discussing the costs of claim construction); 
Fromer, supra note 9, at 774 (“Drafting patent claims is costly, in large part due to the 
abundance of drafted claims and the expensive abstract wording the patentee employs to garner 
broad coverage.”). 
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give the public adequate notice of the claimed property right.196 Often 
the interpretation of those claims does not even accurately reflect the 
fundamental nature of the invention.197 
Consequently, Fromer, Burk, and Lemley recommend that the 
United States move toward a system of central claiming.198 Under a 
central claiming approach, claims would not define the scope of the 
patentee’s rights. Much as it does now, the specification would describe 
the central or prototypical embodiments. But instead of just being used 
to help interpret the claim, these exemplars would actually define the 
scope of the patent. The patent would cover a broader set of similar 
embodiments.199 
While the remedies reform recommended here and central 
claiming share some basic traits, their solutions are quite different. First, 
central claiming addresses two problems that I do not. Central claiming 
would eliminate the costs associated with drafting and interpreting 
claims.200 It also attempts to better align the scope of the patent with the 
patentee’s actual invention.201 
Now both the proposal described in this Article and central 
claiming attempt to address claim breadth, but they do so using 
fundamentally different mechanisms. By placing a greater focus on the 
invention, central claiming eliminates the practice of drafting claims far 
afield from the invention.202 In contrast, my proposal accepts that there 
will be some very broad claims, but reduces the cost of any infringement 
that lies near the edge of those claims. 
But central claiming does very little, if anything, about unclear 
claims.203 Indeed, Burk and Lemley admit that central claiming is 
 
 196 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1751–52; Fromer, supra note 9, at 758. 
 197 Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1765 (“The focus on the meaning of individual words in 
patent claims drafted by patent lawyers has displaced a focus on what the patentee actually 
invented and how significant that invention is.”). 
 198 Id. at 1747; Fromer, supra note 9, at 719. 
 199 Fromer, supra note 9, at 727 (“[In central claiming,] the rightsholder describes the 
central, or prototypical, set members, but the right tends to cover a broader, similar set of 
items.”). 
 200 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1787 (suggesting that central claiming would lead to 
“lower-cost applications and more efficient . . . examinations”); Fromer, supra note 9, at 759. 
 201 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1787 (“The primary advantage of central claiming is 
that it puts the focus on what the patentee actually invented rather than on what patent lawyers 
later (often much later) drafted as claims to cover the ground in that invention.”). 
 202 Id. at 1762 (“If the patent lawsuit were focused on the central features of what the 
patentee invented, overclaiming wouldn’t work.”); Fromer, supra note 9, at 775 (noting that 
patent examiners often have a difficult time imagining all the embodiments that may fall within 
a given claim). 
 203 See Tun-Jen Chiang, Defining Patent Scope by the Novelty of the Idea, 89 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1211, 1239 (2012) (arguing that central claiming has the same problems of the current 
system of peripheral claiming). 
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unlikely to clarify patent rights204 while Fromer is equivocal. She says 
that central claims “might be” more effective at providing adequate 
notice to the public because people should understand central claiming 
better.205 In contrast, my proposal accepts that vague claims will always 
be with us and attempts to adjust remedies law accordingly. 
In sum, advocates of central claiming recommend a fundamental 
change in patent law. They would place less weight on a patent’s claims 
and more weight on the patent’s specification in infringement 
determinations. This Article takes the same tact, but applies it to patent 
remedies. This approach leads to a very different result. The primary 
benefits of central claiming are eliminating the costs of peripheral 
claiming and realigning property rights more closely with the actual 
invention. In contrast, my proposal tailors remedies to the different 
types of infringement that fall upon the infringement continuum. This 
results in a system that is fairer and more predictable. Notably, both 
peripheral and central claiming result in binary outcomes with all-or-
nothing results. Consequently, the reform proposed here could improve 
either the current peripheral claiming system or any of the central 
claiming proposals. 
IV.     THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
The available remedies for patent infringement are money damages 
and a permanent injunction. As discussed earlier, others have already 
argued that a permanent injunction should not be granted for 
infringement that departs too far from what the patent described. These 
proposals exemplify the concept of adjusting the patentee’s remedy 
based on the proximity of the infringement to the patentee’s invention. 
However, they only suggest one coarse adjustment, granting or denying 
a permanent injunction. This Article takes the concept further by 
proposing to calibrate the patentee’s remedy more precisely with money 
damages. To accomplish this goal, there needs to be fundamental 
reforms to the way patent law awards damages. This Article proposes to 
eliminate the current bifurcated lost-profits/reasonable-royalty regime 
and replace it with a royalty framework that calculates damages based 
chiefly on the proximity of the infringement to the invention described 
in the patent’s specification. 
 
 204 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1794 (“Central claiming avoids the problem [of 
unclear claims], not by offering greater determinacy, but by avoiding the pretense that such 
determinacy is possible.”). 
 205 Fromer, supra note 9, at 776 (“Central claims will not excise the problem of language 
ambiguities; but because people appear to build central models of categories in their mind, 
central claims might be just as, if not more, effective to provide content notice to the public.”). 
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Currently, there are two primary forms of money damages: lost 
profits and a reasonable royalty. Under the statute governing patent 
damages, a prevailing patentee can receive lost profits.206 But if the 
patentee does not have any lost profits or is unable to prove them, a 
reasonable royalty is always available.207 Both types of damages are 
intended to return the patentee to the place she would have occupied 
had there been no infringement.208 However, both precedent209 and 
commentators210 agree that the fundamental purpose underlying patent 
law is to promote innovation. To the extent that inventors receive 
financial rewards, it is simply a byproduct of encouraging innovation.211 
This concept is found at the constitutional root of our country’s patent 
laws.212 Yet, as Ted Sichelman has complained, patent remedies 
jurisprudence overlooks this basic premise.213 By focusing on restoring 
patentees to the position they had prior to any infringement, patent 
remedies often ignore the public’s interest in encouraging innovation 
that builds on existing patented technology.214 The result is that both the 
current lost profits and reasonable royalty frameworks overcompensate 
the patentee.215 
 
 206 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the 
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a 
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and 
costs as fixed by the court.”). 
 207 See id. 
 208 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964) (“[The] 
question (is) primarily: had the Infringer not infringed, what would Patent Holder-Licensee 
have made?” (quoting Livesay Window Co. v. Livesay Indus., 251 F.2d 469, 471 (5th Cir. 
1958))); Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 552 (1886) (stating that a patentee’s 
damages are “the difference between his pecuniary condition after the infringement, and what 
his condition would have been if the infringement had not occurred”). 
 209 See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (“The patent 
monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries. 
Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge.”). 
 210 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294 (2003) (“The standard rationale of patent law is that it is an 
efficient method of enabling the benefits of research and development to be internalized, thus 
promoting innovation and technological progress.”); Sichelman, supra note 2, at 530–31 
(“[A]ny form of private law right afforded to the patentee is purely incidental to the aim of 
patent law in promoting innovation.”). 
 211 See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917) 
(“[T]his court has consistently held that the primary purpose of our patent laws is not the 
creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents, but is ‘to promote the progress of science 
and the useful arts’ . . . .” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8)). 
 212 The Constitution authorizes Congress to make laws “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 213 See Sichelman, supra note 2, at 536 (“[The] problem . . . is that the private law remedies 
usually associated with tort law—injunctions and compensatory damages—are not always 
sensible for optimally encouraging innovation.”). 
 214 See id. 
 215 There are also other sources of overcompensation in the current remedies regime that are 
not caused by the way patent law calculates damages. See Bernard Chao, The Case for 
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This Article takes the public interest more seriously and argues that 
patent law should replace the current bifurcated lost-profits/reasonable-
royalty framework with a single scheme that is primarily based on the 
proximity the infringement has to the actual invention. Under this 
proposal, the award a patentee would receive would more closely 
measure what it actually contributed to the infringing product. In the 
next two sections, this Article reviews the lost-profits/reasonable-royalty 
framework and explains how each theory focuses on making patent 
holders whole instead of optimizing innovation. This Article then 
proposes a single royalty remedies framework that balances incentives 
for both early innovators and improvers. 
A.     Lost Profits 
Generally, a lost profits theory of damages concerns itself with the 
money the patentee would have made, but for the infringement. This 
measure of damages applies when the infringer competes with the 
patentee. The basic framework for lost profits consists of a four-part 
test. To obtain lost profits, the patentee must show: “(1) demand for the 
patented product, (2) [the] absence of acceptable noninfringing 
substitutes, (3) [her] manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit 
the demand, and (4) the amount of profit [s]he would have made.”216 If 
a patentee satisfies these four requirements, she has shown what profits 
she would have realized had there been no infringement. Thus, lost 
profits simply attempts to restore the patentee to the position she would 
have enjoyed had the infringement never occurred. 
Unfortunately, the theory of lost profits makes no attempt to 
properly allocate incentives between the patentee and the infringer.217 
The theory is only concerned about the profits the patentee lost. It is not 
concerned about leaving the infringer with any return on its efforts. 
Consider the following hypothetical. Assume that the patentee, 
SmartCo, sells smart phones in a two-supplier market and has a patent 
on some aspect of touchscreen technology that is often used in these 
phones. The infringer, and SmartCo’s only competitor, CellCo, uses the 
same touchscreen technology in its competing smart phones and sells a 
million phones. If SmartCo is seeking lost profits, it will try to prove that 
 
Contribution in Patent Law, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 97, 116–18 (2011) (explaining how juries may 
overestimate the value a component patent contributes to a complex product); Lemley & 
Shapiro, supra note 62, at 2008–09 (explaining how the threat of an injunction leads to 
systematic overcompensation). This Article does not address these problems. 
 216 Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978). 
 217 See Scotchmer, supra note 35, at 30 (“The challenge is to reward early innovators fully for 
the technological foundation they provide to later innovators, but to reward later innovators 
adequately for their improvements and new products as well.”). 
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it would have sold an additional million smart phones, but for CellCo’s 
infringement.218 If CellCo made $10 profits per smart phone, SmartCo’s 
profits were likely to be in that same neighborhood. Thus, SmartCo will 
probably recover $10,000,000—more or less, the profits that CellCo 
made. 
This award makes sense when the patent provides all the value for 
the competing products (i.e., the patentee and the infringer added 
nothing of value to the patented technology to make their smart 
phones).219 However, modern electronic devices often involve hundreds 
if not thousands of patented technologies.220 Moreover, infringers rarely 
just copy patented technology.221 They almost always contribute 
something.222 Some infringers develop unforeseen variations and/or 
improvements of the patented technology. Others may combine the 
patented technology with existing technologies that have no connection 
to the patent.223 Both of these types of infringing activity regularly occur 
in the context of complex electronic devices.224 Still others add more 
vanilla value like “know-how, materials, and marketing efforts.”225 
In the hypothetical discussed above, both the patentee and the 
infringer’s smart phones undoubtedly would have used other patented 
(and unpatented) technology. Smart phones contain fourth-generation 
(4G) communications technology, global position systems (GPS), 
mobile browsers, and software applications like Facebook and iTunes. 
Yet, the patentee would recover all the smart phone profits because it 
patented touch screen technology. Thus, the current lost profits 
framework overcompensates the patentee in all but the simplest cases.226 
This, in turn, under incentivizes infringers that hope to improve on the 
patented technology.227 
The reason why lost profits systematically overcompensates 
patentees is because the remedy is not designed to promote innovation. 
 
 218 For the purposes of this hypothetical, I assume a simplified two-supplier world.  
 219 See Brian J. Love, Note, Patentee Overcompensation and the Entire Market Value Rule, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 263, 272 & n.39 (2007) (suggesting that an award of lost profit overcompensates 
the patentee because the patentee receives “profits earned from value it did not create”). 
 220 See Chao, supra note 215, at 105–06 (discussing various studies that suggest that there are 
hundreds if not thousands of patents involved in today’s everyday electronic devices). 
 221 Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 
1421, 1424 (2009) (finding that copying is quite rare in patent litigation). 
 222 Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 655, 663–64 (2009) (“[I]t is effectively never the case that the patent is responsible for all 
of the value of a product.”). 
 223 See Collins, supra note 157, at 1247–51. 
 224 See Love, supra note 219, at 289. 
 225 Lemley, supra note 222, at 663 (pointing out that infringers often add more mundane 
value like “know-how, materials, and marketing efforts”). 
 226 In contrast, a patent on a drug’s active ingredient may really be the basis for the 
consumer demand. Thus, the rule may make sense for pharmaceutical industry patents. 
 227 See Merges & Nelson, supra note 35, at 843–44. 
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Rather, its goal is to make the patentee whole by returning the patentee 
to the place she would have occupied had there been no infringement. 
However, this type of “make-whole” remedy is fundamentally 
inconsistent with patent law’s goal of encouraging innovation rooted in 
the Constitution.228 If patent remedies were really structured to 
encourage all innovation—infringers that add value to the patent would 
be allowed to retain some of their profits. 
Breaking down the problem further, the current lost-profits 
framework improperly places the focus on the patentee’s entire product 
even when its patent only covers one aspect of the product. It looks at 
the products the patentee would have sold but for the infringer’s sales. 
In contrast, a remedies framework that is concerned about innovation 
would compare the patent to the infringing product to determine what 
contribution the patent made to the product. It would then apportion 
the profits between the patentee and the infringer to provide incentives 
for both the patentee and any contributions the infringer added. 
B.     Reasonable Royalties 
When lost profits are unavailable, the patentee may seek a 
reasonable royalty. Like lost profits, a reasonable royalty award concerns 
itself with the money the patentee would have made, but for the 
infringement. This typically occurs when the patentee does not compete 
with the infringer. For example, many patents are asserted by entities 
whose sole business is to assert patents.229 These entities do not sell 
products and have no profits to lose. Even when there is competition, 
patentees may seek a royalty when they cannot prove lost profits or 
when those profits are just too small. 
Patent law uses the Georgia-Pacific test to calculate reasonable 
royalty awards.230 Jurors are instructed to ascertain the royalty that the 
 
 228 Sichelman, supra note 2, at 518–19 (characterizing patent remedies as tort like, not 
innovation based). 
 229 See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem 
and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 328–31 (2010) (describing how 
“patent assertion entities” behave). 
 230 See Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), 
modified by 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). Reasonable royalty awards can also be calculated using 
“the so-called ‘analytical approach.’” See TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986); accord JOHN SKENYON ET AL., PATENT DAMAGES LAW & PRACTICE § 3:8 (2013). But 
this test is almost never used. Therefore, I will not address it. See Christopher B. Seaman, 
Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BYU 
L. REV. 1661, 1673 (“Today, nearly all reasonable royalty awards are based on the fifteen-factor 
[Georgia-Pacific] test . . . .”). The Model Patent Jury Instructions from the Federal Circuit Bar 
Association does not even mention the “analytical method.” See FED. CIRCUIT BAR ASS’N, 
MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS (Feb. 2012), available at http://memberconnections.com/
olc/filelib/LVFC/cpages/9004/Library/2012%20Updated%20FCBA%20Model%20Patent%20
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parties would have agreed upon had they successfully negotiated a 
license just before infringement began. The hypothetical negotiation 
assumes that the patent at issue is valid and infringed. Of course this is 
different from what would happen during any actual negotiations where 
some discount would be applied for the possibility that the patent is not 
infringed or invalid.231 There are a mind-boggling fifteen factors that are 
used to calculate the royalty under this analysis.232 
 
Jury%20Instructions.pdf. Rather, it defines a reasonable royalty in terms of the hypothetical 
negotiation. See id. § 6.6. 
 231 See ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECONOMIC AND 
LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 229–30 (2005) (explaining why the hypothetical 
negotiation needs to make these counterfactual assumptions to avoid under-compensation). 
 232 See Ga.-Pac., 318 F. Supp. at 1120. The factors are:  
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit, 
proving or tending to prove an established royalty. 
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the patent 
in suit. 
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as restricted 
or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the manufactured 
product may be sold. 
4. The licensor’s established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent 
monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses under 
special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly. 
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as, whether 
they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business; or whether 
they are inventor and promoter. 
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products of 
the licensee; that existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales 
of his non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales. 
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license. 
8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its commercial 
success; and its current popularity. 
9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices, if 
any, that had been used for working out similar results. 
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial 
embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those 
who have used the invention. 
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any 
evidence probative of the value of that use. 
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the 
particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the invention 
or analogous inventions. 
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as 
distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business 
risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer. 
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts. 
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the 
infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both had 
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Although this framework differs from how lost profits are 
calculated, the reasonable royalty is still a kind of make-whole remedy. 
Instead of trying to restore the patentee to the position she would have 
occupied had there been no infringing conduct, a reasonable royalty 
award attempts to place the patentee in the position she would have 
been had the infringer taken a license and continued its conduct. 
Assuming that the goal is to maximize innovation, even this approach 
overcompensates patentees. It does so by intentionally awarding 
damages that are not properly attributable to the patented invention. In 
addition, there are unintended ways that the reasonable royalty 
framework operates in practice that allow patentees to receive even 
larger recoveries. 
First, the entire market value rule explicitly allows patentees to 
recover damages based on the value of the entire product, not just the 
value of the patented component. Ostensibly, the rule only applies 
“where the patented feature creates the ‘basis for [the] customer 
demand’” of the entire product.233 However, as discussed earlier, that is 
almost never true.234 Particularly for the high-tech industry, many 
different technologies and contributions are necessary for any given 
product. Nonetheless, the entire market value rule is routinely applied 
to cases where value can be attributed to things beyond the patent at 
issue.235 In practice, that means patentees are overcompensated.236 
Additionally, the infringer may have even made substantial 
contributions when the patented feature is the basis for the consumer 
demand. Recall the ‘647 patent. It described a computer that recognized 
e-mail addresses, dates, and names in documents and automatically 
allowed the user to perform an action.237 The claims appeared to reach 
substantially further than these embodiments. So software that 
 
been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount 
which a prudent licensee—who desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a license 
to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the patented invention—
would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable 
profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was 
willing to grant a license. 
Id. 
 233 Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
 234 See supra notes 220–25 and accompanying text. 
 235 See Love, supra note 219, at 277 (describing cases where the entire market value rule is 
applied even though “unpatented components of the accused device have independent 
economic value”). 
 236 Lemley, supra note 222, at 664 (“But since there is always at least some value to the 
defendant’s product not attributable to the patent, any application of the entire market value 
rule in a reasonable royalty setting necessarily overcompensates the patent owner by giving it 
value not in fact attributable to the patent.”); see Love, supra note 219, at 289 (concluding that 
the entire market value rule makes little sense “in the arena of complex electronic devices”). 
 237 See supra text accompanying notes 29–32. 
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recognizes facial images and automatically indexes them may be covered 
by a broad claim. Assume this feature is the basis for the consumer 
demand for a digital photo frame, a device that allows a user to display a 
variety of digital images. The entire market rule would apply and the 
patentee would be able to capture royalties based upon the infringing 
digital frames that contain the facial recognition software. Nonetheless, 
it is clear that substantial contributions beyond the ‘647 patent went into 
the digital photo frames. It may be the infringer’s own contributions. 
But more likely, facial recognition technology was the result of 
cumulative incremental efforts from numerous different entities.238 
Unfortunately, the entire market value rule ends up attributing all of 
these contributions to the patentee because they fall within the scope of 
the broad claim. 
Mark Lemley and Brian Love have pointed out how this problem is 
exacerbated by the manner in which “convoyed sales” affect reasonable 
royalty calculations.239 The sixth Georgia-Pacific factor instructs the jury 
to consider “[t]he effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting 
sales of other products of the licensee; that existing value of the 
invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of his non-patented 
items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales.”240 
Consequently, reasonable royalties can be increased because of sales of 
related items that are not covered by the patent at issue. Again this 
analysis fails to consider what else others contributed. For example, 
these products may have been covered by the defendant’s own patents. 
This is especially likely to occur when these other products are not the 
infringing product themselves. Once again, this shows how the current 
framework does not concern itself with leaving any incentives to 
develop technology that works with existing patented technology. 
Although Georgia-Pacific does provide some basis for the jury to 
consider the relative value of the patent, practical problems render these 
factors ineffectual. Factor nine discusses advantages of the patent over 
 
 238 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 25–26 (Oct. 2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balance-
competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf (“[T]echnology developed in 
industries such as semiconductors, computer hardware, and software can contain a large 
number of incremental innovations.”). 
 239 Lemley, supra note 222, at 665 (“[Allowing royalty rates to consider convoyed sales] 
suffers from the same flaw as the application of the entire market value rule: it attributes the 
value of unpatented technologies to the patent owner in circumstances in which the patent 
owner would not have made sales of those technologies, and, therefore, in which the infringer 
would have had to pay to develop or acquire the technology from somewhere else.”); Brian J. 
Love, The Misuse of Reasonable Royalty Damages as a Patent Infringement Deterrent, 74 MO. L 
REV. 909, 931 (2009) (“[T]he ‘convoyed sales’ doctrine . . . overcompensate[s] patent owners by 
allowing them to earn a royalty on value they did not create.”). 
 240 Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified 
by 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). 
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old modes and devices and factor thirteen discusses the portion of the 
profit attributable to the invention as opposed to non-patented 
elements.241 Both of these factors suggest that juries should consider the 
relative worth of the patent, but that does not happen in practice. As 
Chris Seaman suggested “at trial, juries hear extensive evidence from the 
patent holder regarding the critical importance of the patented 
invention but often receive little or no information regarding ‘all the 
other things that contribute to the success’ of the accused product.”242 
This may be caused in part by the scarcity of trial days. Patent litigants 
probably do not have the time to offer all the evidence they want. In 
addition, there are tactical reasons why defendants want to concentrate 
the time they do have challenging liability instead of rebutting 
damages.243 Plainly, juries really do not consider the other contributions 
that helped form the infringing product. The result is that patent 
remedies do not account for the public’s interest in encouraging 
innovation that builds on existing patented technology. 
V.     REFORMING REMEDIES 
For patent law to properly incentivize technology that builds upon 
(or works with) existing patented technology, the law needs to employ a 
more balanced perspective. Specifically, when awarding damages the 
fact finder should consider both: what damages the patentee should be 
awarded and what money the infringer should retain. The infringement 
continuum provides a useful device for considering these issues. Some 
infringement looks just like what the patentee invented. Other 
infringement lies on the outer boundaries of the property right. Of 
course still other forms lie somewhere between these two poles. 
Patentees clearly deserve more compensation when infringement looks 
just like what the patentee invented. Correspondingly, infringers 
deserve to retain more of their own proceeds when they provide larger 
contributions. This occurs when the infringing products depart 
significantly from what the patentee invented. 
A.     The Framework 
I suggest that patent law consider a framework that adjusts the 
amount of damages by the proximity the infringer’s use has to the use 
 
 241 Id. 
 242 Seaman, supra note 230, at 1697–98. 
 243 See Chao, supra note 215, at 117–18 (discussing how defendants fear that presenting an 
alternative damages case may be interpreted by the jury as a concession on liability). 
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envisioned by the inventor. This Article sets forth the basic framework; 
additional details and nuances could be added as parties and courts 
apply the notion of an infringement continuum in awarding damages. 
But I can identify several important characteristics of how patent law 
should use the infringement continuum to calculate monetary damages. 
First, patent law should do away with the bifurcated lost-
profits/reasonable-royalty regime and instead award all successful 
patent plaintiffs a form of royalty. Second, I would discard much of 
current reasonable royalty framework and replace it with a “new” 
royalty that would be based primarily on where the infringement lies 
upon the infringement continuum. Third, this “position” can be 
calculated by comparing the infringing product to the patent 
specification. The law should use this result to determine the royalty the 
patentee is awarded. 
The first characteristic of my proposal is to do away with lost 
profits entirely. By its very nature, awarding lost profits fixes a problem 
that patent law was not intended to address. The theory of lost profits is 
very much a tort theory intended to make an injured party whole.244 But 
if patent law really does not care about enriching inventors,245 then 
awarding lost profits to aggrieved patentees makes no sense. The 
question should not be: how does the law make the patentee whole? But 
rather, what compensation is needed to properly incentivize innovation? 
That means considering incentives for both the patentee and any of the 
infringer’s contributions. A properly framed royalty-based calculation is 
better suited to accomplish this goal because it can look beyond what 
the infringer “lost.” But the existing reasonable royalty framework does 
not do this. 
Consequently, the second characteristic of my proposal is to 
jettison much of current reasonable royalty law and replace it with a 
calculation based on the infringement continuum. That means 
eliminating the entire market value rule. Since a patented feature almost 
never serves as the entire basis for the consumer demand, the rule does 
not apply to the vast majority of cases.246 Moreover, when a patented 
feature forms the basis for the consumer demand, the rule effectively 
gives all the credit to the patentee. That does not make sense when the 
infringer developed a new and improved variation of the patented 
invention. 
 
 244 See supra Part IV.A. 
 245 See supra notes 210–11 and accompanying text. 
 246 The exception is where the patentee contributed the entire value of the infringing 
product. But that is an easy case that the current proposal handles well. When the infringer 
adds nothing of value, the patentee should be allowed to recover most of the infringer’s 
proceeds. To the extent that the infringer is allowed to retain some of its proceeds, that should 
be based on non-technical contributions like marketing and manufacturing operations. 
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The new royalty calculation also needs to discard the Georgia-
Pacific test. There are a number of reasons why this test is not well 
designed to optimize innovation. First, like lost profits, framing a 
reasonable royalty based on a hypothetical negotiation is a kind of 
make-whole remedy. It tries to restore the patentee to the position she 
would have occupied had the infringer taken a license. But as others 
have noted “a patentee need not reap the entire social value of its 
invention in order to be sufficiently incentivized.”247 On a more 
practical level, juries cannot be expected to make sense of a fifteen-
factor test.248 In addition, many of those factors are not concerned with 
the public good. For example, factors four (the licensor’s licensing 
practices), five (the commercial relationship between the patentee and 
the infringer), and fifteen (the amount the parties would have agreed to) 
all consider the relationship of the patentee and the infringer.249 A 
patentee may wish to keep its competitor from using a patented 
technology and only license it for a higher fee. But it may be in the 
public interest to have the competitor include the technology in its 
product for a smaller fee.250 In sum, royalties that are calculated using 
the infringement continuum will look quite different than royalties 
under the Georgia-Pacific test. 
The “new” reasonable royalty would calculate damages based on 
where the infringement lies on the infringement continuum. That 
means the patentee will receive a higher royalty when the infringement 
looks very much like what the patentee invented. The corollary is that 
the infringer will retain more of its own proceeds when the 
infringement looks very different. This should occur when the 
infringer’s contribution is greater.251 
Of course this determination cannot be made by comparing the 
claims to the infringing devices. Claims merely list properties; they do 
not look like anything tangible. To determine where an infringing 
product lies on the infringement continuum, the infringing product 
 
 247 Sichelman, supra note 2, at 552; see also Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, 
and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1046 (2005) (“The assumption that intellectual property 
owners should be entitled to capture the full social surplus of their invention runs counter to 
our economic intuitions in every other segment of the economy.”). 
 248 Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating Reasonable 
Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627, 628 (2010) (“[The Georgia-Pacific test] overloads the 
jury with factors to consider that may be irrelevant, overlapping, or even contradictory.”); 
Seaman, supra note 230, at 1688 (“Georgia-Pacific gives juries little guidance on how to weigh 
the numerous factors and reach a decision on an appropriate royalty.”). 
 249 See Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), 
modified by 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 250 See Eric E. Bensen & Danielle M. White, Using Apportionment to Rein in the Georgia-
Pacific Factors, 9 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 36 (2008) (arguing that value of the patent 
should be judged from a market perspective, not the perspective of the patentee and infringer). 
 251 Alternatively, the infringer could be relying on contributions from third parties. 
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must be compared to the patent’s specification. The degree of similarity 
can then be used to calculate the royalty. 
B.     Benefits 
Incentive royalties addresses the problem of unclear and unduly 
broad claims. Although the reform will not clarify claim scope or 
narrow unduly broad claims, it will ameliorate the problems caused by 
these types of claims. As discussed earlier, the goal of the patent system 
is to maximize innovation. Unduly broad claims thwart this goal. When 
claims reach too deeply into the infringement continuum and cover 
products that look very little like what the patent describes, innovation 
can suffer. Innovators are less willing to build on patented technology. 
This problem is exacerbated when damage awards are high and do not 
reflect contributions that the infringer added to the patented invention. 
My proposal directly addresses this problem. While the current 
lost-profits/reasonable-royalty framework is just concerned with 
providing incentives for the patentee, the proposed reform also allows 
for incentives for those that build on existing patented technology. 
When infringers are making their own contributions that build on 
patented technology, their products will look less like what the patentee 
invented (i.e., the specification). In those situations, the patentee will 
recover less so that the infringer can receive some benefit for its 
innovation. 
Since this solution does not curb claim scope, it does not solve the 
problem of unduly broad claims. Some patentees will still be able to 
successfully assert their patents against products that are fundamentally 
different from the patented inventions. However, their recoveries 
should be much smaller because those kinds of infringements will lie 
deep along the continuum. This in turn should make follow-on 
innovation more likely. 
The proposal should also reduce the problem of unclear claims. 
Figure 4 below illustrates the problem under the current system. The 
different types of infringement that lie upon the infringement 
continuum are found on the horizontal x-axis. The magnitude of the 
patentee’s recovery, D, is shown on the vertical y-axis. D represents the 
damages a patentee receives under the current bifurcated lost-
profits/reasonable-royalty system. The shaded area represents 
uncertainty. Since uncertainty generally lies at the outer boundaries of a 
claim, the shaded area is shown to the right. Initially, no one knows 
whether the patent will be interpreted to have a narrower or broader 
scope. 
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Figure 4 
So long as the infringer falls within the scope of the claim, the 
patentee’s recovery is D. But as soon as the infringer falls outside the 
scope of the claim, the patentee recovers nothing. This suggests that 
damages are not based on where the infringement lies on the 
infringement continuum. Thus, when either party incorrectly 
anticipates whether there is infringement of a valid claim, the size of its 
error is D. 
Now consider the effects of uncertainty when royalties are 
calculated relying on the infringement continuum. Figure 5 shows that 
the patentee’s recovery decreases as the infringement looks less like 
what is described by the patent’s specification. At the outer edge of its 
claim, the patentee’s potential recovery ranges from d1 to d2. In either 
case, both d1 and d2 are substantially less than D, which represents the 
make-whole damages awarded under the current system of lost 
profits/reasonable royalties. Likewise, the cost of incorrectly anticipating 
whether there is infringement of a valid claim is also between d1 to d2. 
CHAO.35.4 (Do Not Delete) 4/10/2014  2:21 PM 
2014] T H E  IN F R IN G E ME N T  C O N T IN U U M  1409 
 
Figure 5 
Reducing the costs of legal uncertainty provides several benefits.252 
First, when the cost of making a mistake is smaller, companies will be 
less likely to forego technology that they were entitled to use.253 That 
benefits both the companies themselves and the consuming public. 
Products are more likely to contain the best technology. At the same 
time, companies are less likely to pay for patent licenses they do not 
need.254 This also reduces the costs to the end consumers. 
C.     Exemplary Implementations 
So far, this Article has only discussed the theory of basing remedies 
on the infringement continuum. This section sets forth a few possible 
examples. In its simplest form, a single score could be used to assess the 
overall similarity between the infringing product and the patent’s 
specification. But by describing a slightly more complex example, this 
Article illustrates how nuanced the proposed framework can be. As 
discussed earlier, similarity can be considered in (at least) two 
dimensions—how far the infringer has changed the basic invention and 
how much the infringer added to that invention.255 Kevin Collins 
characterized the former type of developments as substitutes and the 
 
 252 For a general discussion of the costs of legal uncertainty, see John E. Calfee & Richard 
Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 
(1984). 
 253 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 254 See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. 
 255 See supra text accompanying notes 157–58. 
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latter as complements.256 We could ask the fact finder to measure 
differences in these dimensions by considering percentages.257 One 
hundred percent describes infringement that is identical to what is 
disclosed in the specification. One percent describes an infringing 
product that bears almost no resemblance to anything described in the 
specification.258 The substitute similarity score and complement 
similarity score can be combined to determine what percentage of the 
proceeds the patentee should receive. For the current analysis, 
“proceeds” should be thought of as the infringer’s profits.259 The result 
can be characterized by the following formula: 
Royalty = S x C x Proceeds260 
Looking at the ‘647 patent example again, we can illustrate how this 
proposal operates through two examples. First, consider a smart phone 
that recognizes e-mail addresses in a document and allows the user to 
automatically put them in his address book. The ‘647 patent disclosed 
the e-mail recognition technology in the context of a personal 
computer, but not a smart phone.261 Thus, the e-mail features are very 
similar to what the patent describes. In other words, the infringer adds 
very little to the way the patent already handles e-mail addresses and the 
substitution similarity score should be high. Let us assume that the 
substitute similarity score, S, is 90%.262 In contrast, smart phones were 
unknown at the time the ‘647 patent was filed. Moreover, they clearly 
contain many contributions unrelated to the gist of the ‘647 patent. Let 
us assume that the complement similarity score, C, is 5%. The result 
would be that the patentee would be entitled to 4.5% (i.e., 90% x 5%) of 
the infringer’s proceeds. 
Next let us consider a digital picture frame with facial recognition 
technology that allows a user to automatically display selected pictures 
of family members. The ‘647 patent does not describe either digital 
picture frames or facial recognition technology. Thus, the substitution 
 
 256 See supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text (discussing substitutes and 
complements). 
 257 This approach is not without problems. Collins himself acknowledges that “[i]dentifying 
the ‘spirit’ of an invention is an information-intensive and error-prone exercise.” Collins, supra 
note 157, at 1237. 
 258 Zero percent describes a situation where there is no infringement and it is not available 
for a determination of damages. If the fact finder is already determining the monetary damages, 
there is already a finding of infringement. 
 259 Others may suggest that proceeds should refer to revenue so that infringers that suffer 
losses still pay some compensation. As long as the damages formulation makes some allowance 
for the infringer’s costs, that does not change the basic point of assessing damages based on the 
infringement continuum. 
 260 S represents the substitution similarity score and C represents the complement similarity 
score. 
 261 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 262 Ideally, 100% will be reserved for direct copying. 
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similarity score, S, and the complement similarity score, C, should be 
very low. Assume that the fact finder gives the inventors of the ‘647 
patent a little more credit for the digital picture frame than for the facial 
recognition technology so that S = 2% and C = 5%. The patentee royalty 
would be 0.1% (i.e., 2% x 5%) of the infringer’s proceeds. This example 
illustrates how the patentee’s recovery diminishes when the infringing 
product looks less like what the patentee invented. 
The example outlined above is fairly simple. There are many 
variations that could be used. For example, Collins also suggested that it 
is more appropriate to allow claims to encompass after-arising 
technology with properties that are complements rather than 
substitutes.263 Under that view, a broad claim from the ‘647 patent 
should be allowed to encompass smart phones with the ability to 
recognize e-mail addresses and automatically allow a user to send an e-
mail to that address. However, the claim should not be allowed to cover 
devices that use facial recognition technology to allow a user to sort 
photos. Although Collins’s insight relates to liability (i.e., whether there 
is infringement), it can also be used to tune the remedy. In other words, 
the preceding formula could be modified to include a coefficient, s, 
which adjusts the relative importance of substitutes and complements. 
Royalty = (s x S) x C x Proceeds 
If s were .5, that would suggest that the law gives an infringer more 
credit for contributions that change the heart of the invention (i.e., 
substitute for the primary concept) and less credit for contributions that 
are complements (i.e., change features that are peripheral to the heart of 
the invention). 
Moreover, there may well be other proposals that should be folded 
into a new royalty calculation. For example, Amy Landers suggests that 
damages be apportioned based on the incremental value the patented 
invention adds to the prior art.264 This prevents a patentee from 
receiving compensation for earlier third-party inventions. Hopefully, 
this will avoid royalty stacking problems, where companies are forced to 
pay multiple patent holders for the same technology.265 Lander’s 
proposal can be combined with the previous example by simply 
introducing a term I, which represents the incremental value of the 
 
 263 See Collins, supra note 157, at 1302. 
 264 Amy L. Landers, Patent Claim Apportionment, Patentee Injury, and Sequential Invention, 
19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 471, 473–74 (2012). As Landers recognizes, the basis for her proposal is 
already rooted in the law, but has been lost in the complex Georgia-Pacific test. See id. at 489–
91; see also Lefstin, supra note 68, at 886 n.194 (suggesting the patentee’s remedy be limited 
“[i]f the claimed invention is only a trivial advance over the prior art”). 
 265 Landers, supra note 264, at 473–74. 
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patented invention over the prior art.266 A value of one would suggest 
that there is no useful prior art. As the value of the patented invention’s 
contribution decreases so does I.267 The resulting formula would be: 
Royalty = I x (S x C) x Proceeds268 
For the most part, adding the coefficient I should reduce royalty 
awards. This reflects value that is attributed to the prior art. Of course if 
the prior art is covered by any unexpired patents, those patentees may 
be entitled to some of the infringers proceeds too. 
The point of this discussion is not to endorse any particular 
variation, but merely to show that the proposed reform is neither 
complete nor exclusive. Rather, this Article describes a general 
framework for reforming patent remedies based on the infringement 
continuum. This proposal manages incentives for innovation far better 
than the current system. But there may well be other refinements that 
should be added. 
CONCLUSION 
The problem of overbroad claims is one of the most important and 
intractable problems in patent law. Prior proposals have attempted to 
address this problem by changing the various doctrines that limit claim 
scope. This Article outlines a different tact. It assumes that these 
troublesome claims will remain with us. With this perspective in mind, 
this Article proposes a fundamental reform to patent remedies to 
ameliorate the effects of overbroad claims. 
This proposed reform is novel in two respects. First, it rejects 
current patent remedies as wrongly attempting to restore patentees to 
the place they would have occupied had there been no infringement 
(i.e., a tort law view). Instead, this Article points out that the purpose of 
patent law is to maximize innovation (i.e., a regulatory view). 
Consequently, the proposal takes into account incentives for both 
patentees and any infringers that build on a patentee’s work. Second, the 
proposal ties patent disclosure principles to the remedies patent law 
provides. Thus, it elevates the importance of a patent’s specification by 
making it part of the damages calculation. 
 
 266 This calculation could be far more nuanced by thinking of “improvement” as a 
continuum much like the infringement continuum described in this Article. For the current 
purposes, it is sufficient to consider a simpler view of incremental improvement. 
 267 “I” should always be greater than zero. A value of zero would suggest that the invention 
yields no benefit over the prior art. 
 268 A formula reflecting Collins’s, Landers’s, and my proposal would be Royalty = I x (s x S) 
x C x Proceeds. 
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The proposed reform should have two primary benefits. First, by 
calibrating damages to the contributions made by both the patentee and 
infringer, this proposal will optimize incentives for both early 
innovators and those that would build on basic technology. Second, the 
proposal should reduce the cost of unclear claims. Since the problem of 
unclear claims looms largest at the outer edges of a claim’s scope and 
because the proposal reduces damages at these edges, any errors 
associated with unclear claims are likewise reduced. 
